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The Title IX Paradox
Emily Suski*
When Christine Blasey Ford explained to the Senate Judiciary
Committee why she had not reported her sexual assault at age fifteen,
she captured the struggle of many children who must decide whether
to make such reports: “For a very long time, I was too afraid and
ashamed to tell anyone the details.” Thousands of sexual assaults
happen to children in school each year. Title IX, a potentially powerful
civil rights law, should protect them. Title IX’s main purpose is to
protect individuals from sex discrimination, including in the form of
sexual harassment and assault, in public schools. Yet Title IX rarely
does so. Title IX’s failure of purpose stems in part from courts’
evaluations of the judicially created “actual notice” standard. That
standard requires that students do what Dr. Blasey Ford, out of fear,
could not: report their sexual harassment and assaults. Further,
courts’ assessments of actual notice mandate that schools receive this
notice at particular times, through particular officials, and with
particular information. If any of these strict criteria are not met, Title
IX allows schools to do nothing in the face of students’ sexual
harassment.
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This Article argues that in establishing these particularized
actual notice requirements, courts have constructed a paradox for
students. Courts demand that students do what they largely cannot in
order to access the law’s protections. Applying empirical research in
behavioral psychology and child and adolescent neuroscience to the
analysis of Title IX for the first time in the academic literature, this
Article exposes these flaws in Title IX doctrine and policy and
recommends appropriate changes. It proposes a reconceptualization
of the actual notice standard, a burden-shifting element to Title IX’s
evaluation framework, and statutory modifications that accommodate
for psychological and neurodevelopmental impediments in children’s
decision-making. Such changes would better motivate schools to act in
response to sexual harassment of their students and serve Title IX’s
protective purpose.
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INTRODUCTION
Apart from in their homes, children face the greatest risk of sexual assault
at school.1 Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination in public schools,
including in the form of sexual harassment and assault,2 is designed to protect
students from such harms.3 Yet the law rarely serves this purpose in the Kthrough-twelve public school context.4 Title IX’s failure of purpose results in no
small part from courts’ stringent interpretations of its notice requirements.5
Under current Title IX jurisprudence, schools need only act in response to
students’ sexual harassment if they have actual notice of it.6 In determining what
constitutes actual notice, courts have set the bar so high that students’ Title IX
claims regularly fail.7 Courts have thus rendered this potentially powerful civil
rights law virtually impotent.
Under the courts’ current approach to actual notice, even a school that
knows about a student’s repeated sexual harassment has no obligation to address
1. Robin McDowell et al., Hidden Horror of School Sex Assaults Revealed by AP,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 1, 2017), https://www.ap.org/explore/schoolhouse-sex-assault/hiddenhorror-of-school-sex-assaults-revealed-by-ap.html [https://perma.cc/ER2E-2952]. In finding schools
could be liable for the sexual harassment of students, the Supreme Court acknowledged the scope of the
problem, writing that “[t]he number of reported cases involving sexual harassment of students in schools
confirms that harassment unfortunately is an all too common aspect of the educational experience.”
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998).
2. For the sake of brevity, this Article will use “sexual harassment” as an umbrella term to
include sexual harassment, sexual assault, and sexual abuse unless otherwise noted.
3. Title IX broadly prohibits individuals from being “subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). The
Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition to mean that Congress, in enacting Title IX, “sought to
accomplish two related, but nevertheless somewhat different objectives. First, Congress wanted to avoid
the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices; second, it wanted to provide individual
citizens effective protection against those practices.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
4. See infra Parts 0.A–C.
5. See infra Parts 0.A–C; infra note 46 and accompanying text.
6. In the two cases in which the Supreme Court found that public schools could be liable under
Title IX for teacher and peer sexual harassment of students, the Court said that students bringing such
claims need to show that the public school both had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment and
acted with deliberate indifference to it. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 650 (1999); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. While the deliberate indifference standard is highly
problematic and has been critiqued by scholars because of how little it requires of schools in response
to student sexual harassment, even that minimal response is not required if students cannot satisfy the
stringent actual notice prong of the analysis. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring
Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038 (2016); Emily Suski,
The School Civil Rights Vacuum, 66 UCLA L. REV. 720 (2019).
7. See infra Parts 0.A–C; Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme
Court has set a high bar for plaintiffs seeking to hold schools and school officials liable for student-onstudent sexual harassment.”).
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the issue, unless the school has very specific and timely information about
particular instances.8 Courts effectively demand that students show that schools
receive contemporaneous notice of each occurrence of their sexual harassment
or assault and what it entailed.9
Courts’ interpretations of Title IX’s actual notice standard go beyond just
mandating that students give schools sufficiently specific and timely information
about their sexual harassment and assaults before schools must address them.10
Courts also require that particular school officials receive this information.11
Notice to teachers and other lower-level school staff will not suffice.12 Because
student reporting is the primary way that schools learn of sexual harassment,
courts’ interpretations place the burden on students not only to report their sexual
harassment but also to do so with precision before the law will protect them.13
These stringent interpretations of actual notice leave public schools free to
do nothing in response to sexual harassment, exacerbating the underlying
problem that much sexual harassment and abuse goes unreported. Public school
students vastly underreport their sexual harassment.14 Between 2011 and 2015,
approximately 17,000 K-through-twelve public school students reported being
sexually assaulted in school.15 Yet the actual number of sexual assault cases
during this time was probably closer to 170,000: research suggests that only 9

8. See infra Parts 0.A–C.
9. See infra Parts 0.A–C.
10. See infra Parts 0.A–C.
11. See infra Parts 0.A–B.
12. See infra notes 90–91, 93 and accompanying text.
13. Either students have to report their sexual harassment or schools have to observe it. See, e.g.,
Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 824 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Nothing
in the record shows that . . . school officials observed or that anyone reported sexual behavior by Jason
toward Gabrielle (or anyone else) . . . . Thus, there is no evidence that the defendants had notice of any
harassing conduct . . . .”). Although it is not unheard of for a school staff member to observe a student
being sexually harassed or assaulted, such direct observation is uncommon. Much more typically, the
sexual harassment happens where school staff do not see it, and students’ claims accordingly are
defeated. See, e.g., Kelly ex rel. C.K. v. Allen Indep. Sch. Dist., 602 F. App’x 949, 953 (5th Cir. 2015)
(finding that because peer sexual harassment happened “whenever the teachers weren’t looking” and
“typically took place when the children were unsupervised,” the school did not have actual notice of it).
14. As one study on the incidence of sexual harassment in middle and high school put it, “[t]he
prevalence of sexual harassment in grades 7–12 comes as a surprise to many, in part because it is rarely
reported.” CATHERINE HILL & HOLLY KEARL, AM. ASS’N UNIV. WOMEN, CROSSING THE LINE:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT SCHOOL 2 (2011), https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/Crossing-the-LineSexual-Harassment-at-School.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8DV-MGBN]. Further, research suggests that
cyber sexual harassment is even more underreported than other forms of sexual harassment. Id. at 8.
15. McDowell et al., supra note 1. Even that high number, however, is likely underrepresentative of the problem. Not only are sexual assaults under-reported, but some states do not even
track the incidences of sexual assault in public schools. Id.
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percent of students who suffer sexual harassment report it to their schools.16 Half
of the students experiencing sexual harassment did not report it to anyone at all.17
This Article interrogates and critiques courts’ assessments of the actual
notice standard under Title IX and what it effectively requires of students.
Drawing on empirical research in behavioral psychology and child and
adolescent brain science, this Article argues that in establishing these notice
requirements, courts demand that students do what they often cannot in order to
access Title IX’s protections.18 For all practical purposes, courts require children
to not only make the decision to report their sexual harassment but also to do so
in unrealistically precise ways.19 They require reports of sexual harassment and
abuse at particular times, to particular people, and with particular information.20
Yet behavioral psychology and child and adolescent brain science demonstrate
that children will often decide not to report their sexual harassment at all, let
alone in the particularized ways courts require.21 Both cognitive heuristics and

16. This study also found that 56 percent of girls and 40 percent of boys in grades seven through
twelve have experienced some form of sexual harassment in school. HILL & KEARL, supra note 14, at
2. Of the students who did report their sexual harassment, one quarter reported it to a family member,
but even then, the family member was not always an adult family member. Id. at 3.
17. Id. To put a finer point on this underreporting, despite the thousands of instances of sexual
harassment in schools, in 2017, the United States Department of Education Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
had only 154 open Title IX investigations in public elementary, middle, and high schools, with some
dating back to 2010. Mark Keierleber, The Younger Victims of Sexual Violence in School, ATLANTIC
(Aug.
10,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/
08/the-younger-victims-of-sexual-violence-in-school/536418/ [https://perma.cc/YW4R-G2NL]. In
2016, OCR received only eighty-three Title IX complaints regarding sexual harassment in public Kthrough-twelve schools. Id.
18. It cannot go without saying that scholars have sounded cautionary notes about the law’s use
of empirical evidence. For example, Clare Huntington has pointed out that “[a] central problem with
empirical evidence is that it focuses attention on the outcomes of legal rules and the values underlying
those outcomes . . . , distracting from the other values.” Clare Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family
Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 283 (2018). These points are important and must be considered in the
application of empirical evidence to legal standards and norms. See id. Here, though, the point is not to
use empirical research to focus on particular legal outcomes but instead to question the stringency of the
standard itself as creating a paradox for students by requiring them to do what they cannot. See infra
Parts 0.A–B.
19. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Parts 0.A–C.
21. See infra Parts 0.A–B. In the Title VII context, scholars have critiqued the standard for
evaluating claims of sexual harassment in employment by persuasively arguing that adults’ decisions to
delay reporting or not report sexual harassment are often in fact reasonable. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake
& Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 900
(2008) (“The widespread failure to confront discrimination publicly—by confronting the perpetrator,
lodging an internal complaint, or filing an EEOC charge—is driven largely by an accurate perception
that the costs of such responses will likely outweigh the benefits.”); L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t
“Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 742 (2007) (“[W]omen
who are reluctant to make formal complaints of sexual harassment often have considerable justification
for their failure to take such action or their delays in doing so. Their concerns about the negative
consequences of reporting, including the negative effects on themselves, their work relationships, and
even their harassers, are not unreasonable, but are in fact often borne out by subsequent events.”); Angela
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the nascent development of children’s brains inhibit the decision-making
involved in such reporting.22 Cognitive heuristics are mental shortcuts.23 When
using them, individuals make decisions by substituting simpler evaluations for
more complicated ones.24 Although cognitive heuristics impact the decisionmaking of both children and adults, children’s decision-making is further
hampered by their immature neurological development.25 Children, therefore,
operate under multiple layers of cognitive difficulty when deciding whether to
report their sexual harassment and assaults.26 Courts have thus established a
paradox for students, requiring them to do the nearly impossible in order to find
protection under Title IX.
When the Supreme Court laid out the contours of school liability under
Title IX, the research on cognitive heuristics and child and adolescent brain
science was not as advanced as it is now, and even the extant research had barely
begun to influence law and policy.27 Since then, a body of legal scholarship has
analyzed the ways cognitive heuristics and child and adolescent brain science
should be considered in varying fields.28 None of this empirical research,
Onwuachi-Willig, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo Movement, 128 YALE
L.J. F. 105, 109 (2018) (“[T]he persistent racial biases reflected in the #MeToo movement illustrate
precisely why sexual harassment law must adopt a reasonable person standard that accounts for these
different intersectional and multidimensional identities. In other words, they show why courts should
employ a standard based on a reasonable person in the complainant’s intersectional and
multidimensional shoes, rather than the ostensibly objective reasonable person standard—which some
courts have declared to be male biased—when evaluating sexual harassment claims.”). In the Title IX
context, the students’ decisions to report or not are not scrutinized for reasonableness. See infra Parts
0.A–C. Instead, students must report their sexual harassment at particular times, to particular school
officials, and with particular information—regardless of context or reasonableness.
22. See infra Parts 0.A–B.
23. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 91,
129 (2013).
24. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23; KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 91, 129.
25. See infra Part 0.B.
26. Although both children and adolescents experience decision-making challenges as a result
of their immature neurodevelopment, those challenges differ depending on whether a child is an
adolescent or is younger. See infra Part II.B. For simplicity, references throughout to “children” or
“children’s” neurodevelopment include both children and adolescents.
27. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1473 (1998) (noting in the late 1990s that “[t]he absence of sustained and comprehensive
economic analysis of legal rules from a perspective informed by insights about actual human behavior
makes for a significant contrast with many other fields of economics, where such ‘behavioral’ analysis
has become relatively common”).
28. These fields include administrative law, regulation of social media, environmental law,
juvenile justice, and judicial decision-making. Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Intersection Between Young
Adult Sentencing and Mass Incarceration, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 669 (2018); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside
the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Huntington, supra note 18, at 253–55; Timur Kuran
& Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Selling Heuristics, 64 ALA. L. REV. 389, 403 (2012) (“The regulation of land-based
disposal of hazardous waste in the United States also provides a clear illustration of the power of
availability to direct regulation.”); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and
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however, has been applied to the evaluation of Title IX claims.29 This Article is
the first to contend that Title IX doctrine and policy should take these
developments into account.30
To that end, this Article proposes a reconceptualization of Title IX’s actual
notice requirement that incorporates findings from the vast empirical research on
judgment, heuristics, and children’s brain development. It contends that courts
should reinterpret what constitutes contemporaneous reports of sexual
harassment, to whom those reports should be made, and what information such
reports must include in light of this empirical evidence. These revisions would
expand the meaning of the actual notice standard to better reflect children’s
mental processing abilities, ensure that students’ best efforts to report are legally
sufficient, and prompt school action.31 The point is to compel some response by
the schools in the face of students’ sexual harassment, where now the law
compels almost none because the actual notice standard has created such a high
bar to imposing liability.32
In addition, this Article suggests reworking the Title IX evaluation
framework to incorporate a burden-shifting provision into the assessment of
actual notice. Under the current analysis, children bear the sole burden of
ensuring that schools have adequate notice of their sexual harassment.33 Under
the framework proposed here, public schools would also shoulder some
responsibility for facilitating and encouraging student reporting. Specifically,
under the proposed framework, once a student could show that they provided
some, even legally inadequate, notice of their sexual harassment to the school,
the burden of proof would shift to the schools to demonstrate they had done
something to encourage student reporting. If not, the actual notice element of the
claim would be deemed met.

Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, How Much Would You Pay to Use
Facebook? A Behavioral Perspective (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 18-30, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3173687 [https://perma.cc/5XAA-6NAR]. Other
areas of law to consider cognitive heuristics include tax policy, federal legislation, and tort law. Kuran
& Sunstein, supra.
29. Title IX has been critiqued on other bases, of course. See, e.g., David S. Cohen, Limiting
Gebser: Institutional Liability for Non-Harassment Sex Discrimination Under Title IX, 39 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 311, 316 (2004) (arguing Gebser’s holding should be limited to instances of sexual
harassment and not applied to other forms of sex discrimination in public schools); Catherine Fisk &
Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983,
and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755 (1999) (critiquing, among other things, the Gebser
Court’s rejection of a vicarious liability standard under Title IX); MacKinnon, supra note 6 (critiquing
Title IX’s actual notice and deliberate indifference standard as undermining equality principles); Suski,
supra note 6 (contending Title IX’s liability limits are based on courts’ misconceptions about families
and schools).
30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
31. The required amount of action would depend on an evaluation of the deliberate indifference
standard, which is itself susceptible to critique. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Parts 0.A–C.
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Finally, this Article advances Title IX legislative reforms. It contends that
the law should be revised to require schools to implement procedures that help
students overcome cognitive heuristics and account for the effects of child and
adolescent brain development on their decision-making. Those procedures
would facilitate and promote student reporting of sexual harassment and, as such,
would also work hand-in-hand with this Article’s doctrinal proposals.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by explaining the purpose
of Title IX and describing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, which at once
implied a private cause of action against public schools for students who suffer
sexual harassment while also restricting those claims through the development
of the actual notice standard under Title IX. Part II argues that this jurisprudence
is flawed because it involves a unilateral assessment of whether schools have
sufficient information about sexual harassment without regard for students’
ability to provide it. Part III calls for a reform of Title IX doctrine and policy to
account for the heuristics and neurodevelopmental patterns that make it nearly
impossible for children and adolescents to accommodate courts’ idealized
version of notice in the case of sexual harassment. These proposals are aimed at
relieving some of the burden on students to report their sexual harassment and
abuse. They will therefore help to reinvigorate the protections that Title IX
intended for students who suffer sexual abuse and harassment in school.
I.
TITLE IX NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Enacted in 1972, Title IX amended the federal Education Act with the
purpose of protecting children and others from sex discrimination in public
schools.34 Where existing laws failed to provide such protection, Congress
enacted Title IX to fill the gap.35 To that end, Title IX states that “no person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”36
Yet Congress provided no express private right of action for Title IX’s
enforcement.37 In a series of cases, however, the Supreme Court concluded that
sexual harassment constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex and found an

34. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; Cohen, supra note 29, at 317–18 (“Congress
enacted Title IX in response to the perceived gap created by Title VI and Title VII. Title VI, enacted in
1964, prohibits race discrimination by institutions that receive federal funding. Title VII, also enacted in
1964, prohibits discrimination in employment on a variety of bases, including sex.”).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018).
37. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 683 (1979) (“The statute does not, however,
expressly authorize a private right of action by a person injured by [its] violation . . . .”). Instead,
enforcement of Title IX was initially limited to administrative action by the federal government through
the Department of Education, which had the authority to withhold federal funding for violations of Title
IX. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 280–81 (1998).
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implied private right of action under Title IX, including for both teacher and peer
sexual harassment of students.38 In doing so, the Court noted Title IX’s
protective purpose, stating “Title IX focuses more on ‘protecting’ individuals
from discriminatory practices” in public education.39
At the same time, though, the Court hewed to a relatively narrow standard
for public school Title IX liability. The Court concluded that public schools
could not be held liable for violating Title IX unless a student could show that
the school had actual notice of the sexual harassment and acted with deliberate
indifference to it.40 The Court also explicitly sought to confine public schools’
Title IX liability with the actual notice standard.41 In Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, the Court emphasized that the standard would “limit a
[school’s] damages liability.”42

38. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646–47 (1999) (“We
thus conclude that recipients of federal funding may be liable for ‘subject[ing]’ their students to
discrimination where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student sexual
harassment . . . .”); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (“In sum, we conclude
that a damages remedy is available for an action brought to enforce Title IX.”); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292–
93 (“[W]e will not hold a school district liable in damages under Title IX for a teacher’s sexual
harassment of a student absent actual notice and deliberate indifference.”); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 725
(“The Court further concludes that even if it cannot be persuasively demonstrated that Title VI created
a private right of action, nonetheless this remedy should be inferred in Title IX . . . .”).
39. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287. Courts have also rejected any claim of sovereign immunity under
Title IX. They have rejected it under one of two rationales. David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal
Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 217, 234 (2005). First, they point out that Title IX is a Spending
Clause statute and that it contains an express abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 234–
35. Second, others have come to the same conclusion because Title IX was enacted under Congress’s
authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore abrogates states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Id. at 236.
40. Davis, 526 U.S. at 646–47; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 293. The Court made clear that public
schools are not liable under Title IX for the sexual harassment itself but for their own deliberate
indifference to it. Davis, 526 U.S. at 641 (“We disagree with respondents’ assertion, however, that
petitioner seeks to hold the Board liable for G.F.’s actions instead of its own. Here, petitioner attempts
to hold the Board liable for its own decision to remain idle in the face of known student-on-student
harassment in its schools.”). The Court therefore explicitly rejected a constructive notice standard for
public school liability. Id. at 642 (“[In Gebser,] we declined the invitation to impose liability under what
amounted to a negligence standard—holding the district liable for its failure to react to teacher–student
harassment of which it knew or should have known.”). The Court stated that a constructive notice
standard would not afford the school the opportunity “to take action to end the harassment or limit further
harassment.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289.
41. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649 (“We believe, however, that the standard set out here is sufficiently
flexible to account both for the level of disciplinary authority available to the school and for the potential
liability arising from certain forms of disciplinary action.”); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 (“Where a statute’s
express enforcement scheme hinges its most severe sanction on notice and unsuccessful efforts to obtain
compliance, we cannot attribute to Congress the intention to have implied an enforcement scheme that
allows imposition of greater liability without comparable conditions.”).
42. 526 U.S. at 645. Specifically, the Court said that the actual notice and deliberate indifference
standards would together limit public school liability. Id.
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The Court reasoned that this narrow, liability-limiting standard better
comported with the statute’s protective purpose.43 Yet rather than furthering the
statute’s protective purpose, this effort to shield public schools from liability
under Title IX ultimately set its jurisprudence on a collision course with its
purpose.44 Because public schools are not liable for any sexual harassment in
schools absent actual notice of it, the law does not require them to act to address
the harassment in any way.45 The law’s protections are simply not triggered
without actual notice.
Cases in the lower courts applying the actual notice standard have borne
out this collision. In interpreting this standard, courts have set the bar so high
that Title IX protects very few students in K-through-twelve public schools.46
For all practical purposes, in order to access Title IX’s protections, students must
report their sexual harassment with a high level of specificity in ways that
involve a complicated set of assessments.47 Unless these students successfully
navigate this decision-making terrain, schools have no obligation to respond at
all to students’ reports of sexual harassment and abuse.48 They may even escape

43. The Court compared Title IX to Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination, as
follows: “whereas Title VII aims centrally to compensate victims of discrimination, Title IX focuses
more on ‘protecting’ individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal
funds.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287. Further, the Court reasoned that Title IX’s spending clause and
“contractual framework distinguishes Title IX from Title VII,” which allows for a damages remedy
under agency principles. Id. at 286; see also Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of
Action: The Court’s Expanded Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally
Funded Programs, 67 MD. L. REV. 358, 375 (2008) (noting the Court concluded that “imposing liability
on schools that are neither aware of discrimination, nor contribute to its continuation, would not serve
to protect students from the schools’ discriminatory actions”). But see Gebser, 524 U.S. at 301; infra
note 129 and accompanying text.
44. See Suski, supra note 6, at 759.
45. See supra note 38 (citing Gebser and Davis).
46. See infra Parts 0.A–C. Further, in their treatment of actual notice under Title IX, courts go
beyond traditional common law requirements for actual notice. Under those standards, a plaintiff can
establish actual notice by offering evidence that a defendant had either express or implied notice of an
event. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notice § 4 (2012). “‘Actual notice’ can be divided into two categories: (1) express,
which includes direct communication, and (2) implied, which is inferred from the fact that the person
charged had the means of obtaining knowledge that he or she did not use. Express notice is actual notice
consisting of knowledge brought personally home while implied notice is knowledge imputed and
charged because of the surrounding facts and circumstances, which would lead one to discover or learn
the fact by exercising ordinary care. . . . [I]mplied notice is also actual notice of facts or circumstances
that, if properly followed up, would have led to knowledge of the particular fact in question.” Id. § 5. By
contrast, constructive notice is when a person “could have discovered the fact by proper diligence, and
his or her situation was such as to cast upon him or her the duty of inquiring into it.” Id. § 4. Implied
actual notice and constructive notice, therefore, are close cousins. Id. § 4; see also Radiology Ctr., S.C.
v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 919 F.2d 1216, 1222 (7th Cir. 1990); Potash Co. of Am. v. Int’l Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 213 F.2d 153, 155 (10th Cir. 1954); Latta v. W. Inv. Co., 173 F.2d 99, 106 (9th Cir. 1949);
Sapp v. Warner, 141 So. 124, 127 (Fla. 1932). In the Title IX context, courts mandate that students show
evidence of express notice to schools to the exclusion of any implied notice. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
47. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Title IX liability by remaining deliberately indifferent to such reports.49
Unsurprisingly, then, many Title IX claims fail, leaving students who suffer
sexual harassment in public schools simply unprotected by the law.50
A. Notice at Particular Times
Although the Supreme Court set forth the actual notice standard in two
landmark cases, the question of when schools must have that notice has only
been addressed by lower courts.51 Lower courts effectively require
contemporaneous reporting of student sexual harassment.52 Courts find that both
delays in reporting and prior warnings of probable sexual harassment fail to meet
the actual notice requirement.53
When students delay reporting of sexual harassment by virtually any
measure of time, this proves fatal to their Title IX claims.54 For example, in the
Seventh Circuit case Davis ex rel. M.D. v. Carmel Clay Schools, high school
freshman M.D. was subjected to verbal and physical sexual harassment,
including assaults on his buttocks and genitals, by members of the boys’
basketball team.55 The harassment happened almost daily from November of
M.D.’s freshman year through the following January or February.56 In one
incident, four senior boys assaulted M.D. on a bus.57 However, M.D. did not
immediately report that incident or any of the other harassment he suffered.58
Instead, some weeks later the mother of another student heard about the assaults
and reported them to the school.59 Because the school learned of these instances
of harassment and assault a few weeks to a few months after they occurred, the
court concluded the school lacked actual notice of the abuse.60 Therefore, M.D.’s

49. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Courts also limit schools’ liability under Title IX
through the application and interpretation of the deliberate indifference requirement. Problems with the
justifications for that standard, as well as its perverse incentives, have been addressed in recent
scholarship. See Suski, supra note 6; MacKinnon, supra note 6.
50. See infra Parts 0.A–C.
51. See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646–47 (1999);
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 293 (1998). The term “teacher” is used throughout
as a shorthand for any school staff member or employee. The public schools can potentially be liable
under Title IX for any school employee who sexually harasses a student, whether that employee is a
teacher, administrator, or other school staff member. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 293.
52. See infra notes 54, 69, 80 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 54, 69, 80 and accompanying text.
54. Similarly, in Doe v. Galster, a middle school girl reported some harassment close in time to
its occurrence but delayed reporting the most severe sexual harassment she suffered until the last day of
her seventh-grade year in school. 768 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2014). Because the school did not learn of that
sexual harassment until the last day of school, the Seventh Circuit found that the school did not have
actual notice of the sexual harassment. Id. at 617–18.
55. 570 F. App’x 602, 603–04 (7th Cir. 2014).
56. Id. at 603–04.
57. Id. at 604.
58. Id. at 603–04.
59. Id. at 604.
60. Id. at 605.
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Title IX claim could not succeed.61 The school, consequently, had no obligation
to address the assaults’ effects or prevent further assaults; Title IX posed no
obstacle to complete inaction by the school.62
At the same time, a school’s prior awareness of one student’s history and
pattern of sexually assaulting and harassing another student does not constitute
notice of other, even intervening, sexual assaults by the same student.63 In Doe
v. Board of Education of Prince George’s County, for instance, fellow student
M.O. repeatedly sexually harassed and assaulted nine-year-old J.D. over the
course of two years.64 The school knew, among other things, that M.O. had
exposed himself to J.D. and, separately, tried to climb into J.D.’s bathroom stall
while M.O.’s pants were down.65 However, J.D. did not report three intervening
sexual assaults that M.O. committed against him until approximately one year
after they occurred.66 The Fourth Circuit found that the school’s notice of some
of the harassment and assaults neither served as notice of the others nor imposed
any obligation to investigate whether they were occurring.67 The court stated that
imposing such an obligation on the school would mean “substitut[ing] a
negligence standard for the deliberate indifference standard” that requires
schools to act with something more than deliberate indifference in response to
sexual harassment of which they are aware.68
The Fourth Circuit’s treatment of the actual notice standard, however, is
problematic for at least two reasons. First, it conflates the actual notice and
deliberate indifference prongs of the Title IX standard.69 It does so by counting
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159, 161–63 (4th Cir. 2015); see also infra note 67 and
accompanying text.
64. Doe, 605 F. App’x at 161–63.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 163.
67. Id. at 167–68. The Fourth Circuit is not alone in these conclusions. The Fifth and Seventh
Circuits have also required students to show that the schools had direct, near-simultaneous evidence of
both peer and teacher sexual harassment. In Kelly ex rel. C.K. v. Allen Independent School District, the
father of middle school student C.K. wrote the school district superintendent to express concern that
another middle school boy, B.H.—who had sexually assaulted a student a few months earlier—would
repeat the offense when he returned to school. 602 F. App’x 949, 950 (5th Cir. 2015). The school did
nothing in response to protect C.K. or address his father’s concerns. Id. at 951. When B.H. then did
sexually harass and assault C.K., the Fifth Circuit found that neither the parent’s written concerns nor
C.K.’s report of the assault a few weeks afterward established actual notice. Id. at 951–53. The court
stated that the evidence “falls far short of Title IX’s stringent actual-knowledge standard” and, almost
incredibly, concluded that the school district “had no knowledge of facts that would permit the inference
that C.K. faced a substantial risk of serious harassment.” Id. at 953–54. The Seventh Circuit has also
required contemporaneous notice of each incident of sexual harassment. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text; infra note 70 and accompanying text.
68. Doe, 605 F. App’x 159, 168.
69. On this point, the Fourth Circuit cited a 2015 Seventh Circuit decision, Doe v. Galster, 768
F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2014). In Galster, the student—who was sexually harassed repeatedly over a period
of time—reported some, but not all, of the harassment and argued that her school should have
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any action a school might take to discover potential sexual harassment as an
action to address the sexual harassment that it already knows about.70 In other
words, the court treats any school action to obtain actual notice of potential
sexual harassment as an action that satisfies the deliberate indifference standard
for responding to known sexual harassment.71 The Supreme Court, however,
designated the deliberate indifference standard as a threshold for schools’
responses to known sexual harassment, not one that restricts any notice
obligations on the part of schools.72 Thus, the deliberate indifference standard
should not operate as a limit on what schools must do to uncover any other
potential sexual harassment.73
Second, although the Supreme Court did place limits on public schools’
obligation to discover potential sexual harassment, the Fourth Circuit’s
assessment exceeds the bounds contemplated by the Court.74 When the Supreme
Court adopted the actual notice standard in Gebser and Davis, it “declined [to
hold] the district liable for its failure to react to . . . harassment of which it knew
or should have known.”75 However, the Court did not consider in either case
whether that limitation applied to instances in which the school already has
actual notice of some, or even extensive, sexual harassment.76 The Davis
standard thus does not preclude the possibility that notice of some sexual
harassment may give rise to an obligation on the part of schools to try to
determine the full extent of the problem.77 In failing to acknowledge or grapple
with these points, the Fourth Circuit’s evaluation means that a school’s notice of

investigated the reported instances of her harassment to determine the full extent of the problem. Id. at
619. Rejecting that argument, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that to do otherwise would amount to
“substituting a negligence standard for the . . . deliberate indifference standard[] . . . under Davis.” Id.
Both courts thus not only conflate notice with deliberate indifference but also treat the distinction
between actual and constructive notice as a self-evident binary: actual notice requires express, direct
evidence; constructive notice does not. Under the common law, however, that particular binary has not
existed; actual notice has encompassed implied notice. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
70. See Davis ex rel. M.D. v. Carmel Clay Sch., 570 F. App’x 602, 605–06 (7th Cir. 2014).
71. See id.
72. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999)
(emphasizing that the deliberate indifference standard operates to provide schools with “flexibility” in
their reactions to known sexual harassment and “stress[ing] that our conclusion here—that recipients
may be liable for their deliberate indifference to known acts of peer sexual harassment—does not mean
that recipients can avoid liability only by purging their schools of actionable peer harassment or that
administrators must engage in particular disciplinary action”).
73. See id. at 647–48.
74. Id. at 642.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 646–47. The Court did not, for example, say whether a school with notice of sexual
harassment occurring on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays but not on Tuesdays and Thursdays would
have no actual notice of the Tuesday and Thursday harassment—or bear any obligation to determine
whether the Monday, Wednesday, Friday harassment extended to Tuesday and Thursday. See id. Indeed,
at least one federal district court has concluded that repeated sexual harassment can serve as notice of
other sexual harassment, potentially amounting to an arguable pattern. See infra note 80 and
accompanying text.
77. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 646–47.
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some sexual harassment triggers no obligation by the school to uncover potential
additional sexual harassment—no matter how much reason a school might have
to suspect it.78 Nor is the Fourth Circuit alone in imposing these restrictions on
schools’ obligations to investigate student sexual harassment: in fact, it followed
the lead of the Seventh Circuit in imposing them.79
By employing such problematic reasoning, courts transform the Title IX
actual notice requirement into one that demands that notice of sexual harassment
occur almost simultaneously with the harassment itself before schools bear any
responsibility to address it.80 Courts, therefore, require students to walk a
reporting tightrope because their reports can fail at both ends of the timing
spectrum.81 When students delay reporting sexual harassment to schools, courts
may deem the notice untimely.82 When schools receive prior warnings of the
likelihood that sexual harassment will occur, that may also constitute untimely
notice.83 In either scenario, schools would have no obligation to address or
prevent sexual harassment.84
B. Notice to Particular Individuals
Not only must students bringing Title IX claims establish that schools have
contemporaneous notice of their sexual harassment, they must also show that
particular, higher-up individuals in the school receive that notice. In Gebser, the
Supreme Court said that notice of sexual harassment for Title IX purposes could
not be provided to just any staff member of the public schools.85 Instead, a public
school could only be held liable for teacher sexual harassment of students if an
“appropriate person” in the public school received that notice.86 The Court
defined an “appropriate person” as “at a minimum . . . [a school official] with

78. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159, 167–68 (4th Cir. 2015).
79. See Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2014); supra note 76 and accompanying text.
80. This treatment of what constitutes contemporaneous notice is not mandatory: at least one
district court has adopted a less narrow interpretation. Kauhako v. Haw. Bd. of Educ., No. 13-00567
DKW-BMK, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12753, at *7–10 (D. Haw. Feb. 3, 2015) (“[T]he Court rejects
Defendant’s suggestion that prior notice of the initial off campus sexual assault was not sufficient to
alert school officials to the subsequent assaults that occurred on campus.”). In Kauhako, student Mariana
Doe was raped repeatedly by another student in school. Id. at *2–3. On a motion to dismiss Doe’s Title
IX claim, the school argued that the first rape did not provide notice of subsequent rapes. Id. at *8. The
court rejected these arguments. Id. at *8–10. Stating that the school official need only have “enough
knowledge” of the harassment that “it reasonably could have responded with remedial measures,” it
effectively found that some sexual harassment gives notice of other sexual harassment. Id. Yet at least
three federal circuits treat contemporaneous notice differently, demonstrating the difficult needlethreading many courts find students must engage in to establish a Title IX claim. See supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 54, 78 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 54, 69, 78 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 54, 69, 78 and accompanying text.
85. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
86. Id.
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authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination.”87 When the Court
subsequently decided in Davis that public schools could also be liable for peer
sexual harassment, the Court was not so explicit about who should have actual
notice of the sexual harassment.88 However, lower courts assessing peer sexual
harassment claims under Title IX follow the Court’s lead in Gebser and require
that an “appropriate person” have this actual notice.89 Absent notice to such
persons, schools are not obligated to address student sexual harassment.
When assessing students’ Title IX claims, courts generally find that the
categories of “appropriate persons”—those with “authority to take corrective
action to end the discrimination”—are limited to such school administrators as
assistant principals, principals, and even higher-level administrators.90 School
teachers and other non-administrative school staff generally do not qualify.91 In
the context of peer sexual harassment, lower-level school staff can know about
and even facilitate the harassment: as long as they do not inform the school
administrators about it, the actual notice requirement is not met.92 In fact, the
Eleventh Circuit has suggested that even when a teacher actively instigates one
student’s sexual assault of another, that teacher’s knowledge does not constitute
adequate notice because a teacher is not a school administrator.93

87. Id.
88. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651–52 (1999)
(suggesting that “[d]istrict administrators” are appropriate officials to receive notice). The Court focused
more instead on how the standard it set forth limited school liability, repeatedly explaining that schools
would not be beset by Title IX litigation. Id. The Court pointedly noted, for example, that the standard
precluded a successful Title IX action for “simple acts of teasing and name calling among school
children.” Id. at 652.
89. E.g., Hill ex rel. BHJ v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 971 (11th Cir. 2015) (limiting the definition
of “appropriate person” to those school administrators with the “authority to discipline students for
sexual harassment”).
90. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. For example, in Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger
County, multiple students sexually harassed student D.S. during his seventh and eighth grade years in
school. The court found that because the principal and assistant principal knew, the actual knowledge
requirement “that a single school administrator with authority to take corrective action had actual
knowledge” was indisputably met without further analysis. 819 F.3d 834, 848 (6th Cir. 2016).
91. See Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 2011).
92. See id.
93. In Hill, one student raped another in a school bathroom as the result of a scheme devised by
a teacher’s aide, yet the court described the aide’s knowledge and development of the plan as insufficient
to satisfy the actual notice standard. 797 F.3d at 963–64, 971. The teacher’s aide concocted a plan to use
student Jane Doe as bait to catch student C.J.C. in the act of sexual harassment; C.J.C. then raped Doe,
who brought a Title IX action against the school. Id. In evaluating the claim, the court found that the
teacher’s knowledge and facilitation of the rape did not satisfy Title IX’s actual notice requirement. Id.
at 971. Instead, the student’s Title IX claim survived on an alternate ground: the court found that the
evidence could establish that the principal or assistant principal had knowledge of the sexual harassment
and rape-bait scheme. Id. at 971–72. Because the facts, construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, sufficed to show that the school principal knew about the rape-bait scheme, the principal’s
knowledge satisfied the Title IX actual notice requirements for summary judgment purposes. Id. Had
the principal or assistant principal not had that information, then the court’s opinion all but concluded
that the actual notice requirement would not have been met. See id.
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When sexual harassment is perpetrated by teachers or other school staff,
the notice requirements are arguably and counterintuitively even more stringent
and context specific. First, if the sexual harassment is perpetrated by a school
employee, the harasser’s own knowledge does not suffice to meet the actual
notice requirements under Title IX.94 A student still must report any sexual
harassment or abuse to a school administrator.95
Second, even when the wrongdoer is a school administrator, leaving the
student with no higher-level person in the school building to whom to report, the
wrongdoer’s knowledge still does not suffice to satisfy the actual notice
standard.96 Someone else with authority to remedy the sexual harassment must
be told.97
Third, when the wrongdoer is a school employee, courts have determined
that who constitutes an “appropriate person” also depends on how and where the
harassment occurred.98 For example, if the sexual harassment or assault happens
off-campus but still under the purview of the school, a report to a principal or
assistant principal may not suffice to satisfy Title IX’s actual notice
requirement.99 In Santiago v. Puerto Rico, where a bus driver molested six-yearold Jherald, a student with bilateral hearing loss, the First Circuit concluded that
reports to the school social worker, teacher, and attempts to report to the principal
did not satisfy the actual notice standard.100 The court found that those reports
failed because none of those individuals had the authority to take corrective
action against the bus driver, whose employment the Puerto Rico Department of

94. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291 (1998). The Court in Gebser was
explicit on this point: “where a school district’s liability rests on actual notice principles . . . the
knowledge of the wrongdoer himself is not pertinent to the analysis.” Id.
95. See Salazar v. S. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 953 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 2017); Stiles,
819 F.3d at 848; Hill, 797 F.3d at 963–64, 971; Santiago, 655 F.3d at 73–74.
96. Such was the case in Salazar, where Michael Alcoser—the school’s vice principal and then
principal—began molesting third grade student Adrian Salazar. 953 F.3d at 274–75. The abuse
continued through Adrian’s fifth grade year. Id. at 275. The parties stipulated that Alcoser had the
authority to remedy the abuse and was the highest-level authority in the school to whom Adrian could
report the abuse; yet because he was also the perpetrator, the court concluded that Adrian did not meet
the actual notice requirement under Title IX. Id. at 275, 278.
97. Id. at 278. In his dissent in Gebser, Justice Stevens noted that this standard departed
drastically from settled principles of agency law. He argued that the teacher’s sexual harassment of a
student in Gebser “present[ed] a paradigmatic example of a tort that was made possible, that was
effected, and that was repeated over a prolonged period because of the powerful influence that Waldrop
had over Gebser by reason of the authority that his employer, the school district, had delegated to him.
As a secondary school teacher, Waldrop exercised even greater authority and control over his students
than employers and supervisors exercise over their employees. His gross misuse of that authority
allowed him to abuse his young student’s trust.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 299 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. See Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2011).
99. Id. at 66, 74.
100. Id. at 74–75.
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Education supervised.101 “This defect alone is fatal to the plaintiff’s Title IX
claim,” the court concluded.102
C. Notice with Particular Information
Finally, courts require that reports of sexual harassment include particular
information to satisfy the Title IX actual notice standard. In Gebser, the
information provided to the principal about student Alida Star Gebser’s sexual
relationship with a high school teacher consisted of “a complaint from parents of
other students charging only that [the teacher] had made inappropriate comments
during class . . . .”103 The Supreme Court found this information “plainly
insufficient to alert the principal to the possibility that Waldrop was involved in
a sexual relationship with a student.”104 The Court did not specify, though, how
much more information must be reported to satisfy the actual notice standard.105
In Davis, the Court stated that the “most obvious example” of peer sexual
harassment violating Title IX would be “a case in which male students physically
threaten their female peers every day, successfully preventing the female
students from using a particular school resource—an athletic field or a computer
lab, for instance.”106 However, the Court did not specify how much less
information on harassment would suffice.107 The Court thus has established the
ends of the informational continuum but has not drawn any guiding lines in
between the two poles.
In assessing the actual notice standard, however, the lower courts draw
these lines themselves. They require very specific information about each
instance of sexual harassment and what it entails to establish actual notice.108 In
cases of peer sexual harassment, courts find even multiple reports of sexual
harassment insufficient to establish actual notice of the full extent of severe
harassment and abuse if other instances go unreported.109 Courts require the
101. Id. at 74 (“A school principal may, in at least some instances, be considered an appropriate
person for the receipt of such notice. But where, as here, the alleged harasser is not a person subject to
the principal’s customary disciplinary authority, the principal may not qualify as an appropriate person.”
(citations omitted)).
102. Id.
103. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291 (1998).
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650–51 (1999).
107. See id.
108. See infra notes 109, 111 and accompanying text. As Catherine MacKinnon notes regarding
courts’ assessment of Title IX’s notice requirement, “[t]he implicit rule often appears to be that schools
do not know enough for actual notice standards until they are informed of an exact specific possibility
that then becomes an actuality.” MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 2070.
109. For example, in Doe v. Board of Education, where student M.O. sexually harassed and
assaulted student J.D. throughout J.D.’s fourth and fifth grade years in school, the court found the school
had no notice of three sexual assaults despite the school’s knowledge of the persistent and ongoing
sexual harassment. 605 F. App’x 159, 166–170 (4th Cir. 2015). The court affirmed the lower court’s
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schools have direct, explicit knowledge about each instance of sexual
harassment.110 Similarly, in cases of teacher sexual harassment of students,
students have to effectively show that the school had notice of the sexual acts
themselves to establish actual notice.111 Reports of credible suspicions about the
harassment by parents, other school staff, and students are even collectively
insufficient.112
Further, courts still find that schools have no actual notice of the sexual
harassment when students try to directly and explicitly report it but use vague
language. Even when students’ inability to be more specific results from
disability-related language problems, the inability has not mattered.113 For
example, in Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School District, a Tenth
Circuit case, middle school student K.C. reported that “these boys were
bothering me” in the second year of the three years during which she endured

conclusion that the Title IX claim based on the sexual assaults could not stand because J.D. had not told
the school about those precise sexual assaults until a year after they occurred. Id. Similarly, in Doe v.
Galster, middle school student Jane Doe faced harassment based on both her sex and national origin
consistently during her sixth and seventh grade years in school; yet the court found that Doe did not
establish actual notice under Title IX because, although the school knew of the verbal harassment, it did
not learn about Doe’s physical harassment and assaults until “the evening of the last day of her seventh
grade year.” 768 F.3d 611, 617–18 (7th Cir. 2014).
110. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
111. In Campbell v. Dundee Community Schools, a middle school basketball coach engaged in a
sexual relationship with student Jane Doe. 661 F. App’x 884, 886–89 (6th Cir. 2016). Despite repeated
complaints to school administrators about the coach’s behavior toward and relationship with Jane Doe,
the court found the school did not have actual notice of the harassment. Id. The court said, “the plaintiff
must be able to show that the authority figures were on notice of a substantial risk of the actual type of
harassment that occurred.” Id. at 888. In Doe v. Flaherty, an Eighth Circuit case, a high school basketball
coach, Chad Smith, had a sexual relationship with high school student Jane Doe. 623 F.3d 577, 580–82
(8th Cir. 2010). Smith sent inappropriate texts to students, including “are you drunk yet?” and “OMG
[oh my god] you look good today.” Id. at 580–81. The school superintendent’s secretary, a relative of
Jane Doe, reported concerns to the superintendent and to Jane’s mother about Smith’s relationship with
Jane, including that “something was going on” with them. Id. at 581. Because Jane did not report the
sexual relationship at the time it was happening, the court concluded that the other evidence, warnings,
and expressions of concern about Smith’s behavior and relationship with Jane failed to meet the actual
notice standard. See id. at 584–85. Jane’s failure to disclose the relationship at the time it was occurring
therefore proved fatal to her claim. Similarly, in J.F.K. ex rel. O.K.K. v. Troup County School District,
substantial evidence—from parents, teachers, and students—of a teacher’s behavior with a student that
was “inappropriate, devoid of professionalism, and reek[ing] of immaturity” failed to satisfy the actual
notice standard because neither the student nor anyone else reported the sexual relationship with this
teacher. 678 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2012). More specifically, the school principal knew from parents
that the teacher, Elizabeth Gaddy, was “possessive” of twelve-year-old male student O.K.K. Id. at 1258.
The principal also knew that Gaddy “constantly” sent text messages to O.K.K. Id. Further, O.K.K.’s
father expressed concerns to the principal about Gaddy’s attentions to his son, and another parent told
the principal that she had seen Gaddy at her home sitting on a couch with O.K.K. under a blanket with
their bodies touching. Id. at 1258–59. Yet O.K.K. never reported the sexual relationship while it was
occurring, and the court concluded that the school “was never put on notice of any single act, or
combination of acts, of actual sexual harassment by Gaddy.” Id. at 1260. The school’s failure to
intervene or protect O.K.K. therefore did not constitute a violation of Title IX. Id.
112. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., infra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
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sexual harassment and assaults by those boys.114 Notably, K.C. had a disability
related to a childhood brain injury.115 Although the boys had “persistently and
continuously pestered her for oral sex” and coerced her into performing oral sex
starting in seventh grade, K.C. lacked the language skills to specifically report
this information.116 K.C. testified that she did not know the word “assault.”117 In
response to K.C.’s complaints about the boys bothering her, the school did
virtually nothing to protect K.C. or address her complaints.118 Nor did the school
even follow up on K.C.’s complaints to determine how the boys were bothering
her, or what she meant by her complaints.119 K.C.’s Title IX claims still failed,
though, because despite her reporting to the best of her abilities, the court deemed
K.C.’s reports insufficient to establish that the school had actual notice of her
sexual harassment.120
Children whose young age limits their reporting capacity fare no better.
Their age-related lack of language skills does not make up for the failure to
provide a clear report of their sexual harassment.121 For example, in Gabrielle
M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, the Seventh Circuit found kindergartner
Gabrielle M.’s testimony about her classmate “bothering” her and doing “nasty
stuff” inadequate to establish notice of severe sexual harassment.122 Even though
Gabrielle was only in kindergarten, the court found Gabrielle’s statements too

114. 511 F.3d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 2008).
115. Id.
116. Id. In addition, the boys called K.C. “retard” and “stupid” while threatening to spread rumors
about her sexual activity and distribute naked pictures of her. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1120. K.C. also suffered harassment because she had to have a one-on-one aide in her
math class. Id. at 1117. The school did act to address that disability-related harassment, but it did nothing
to address or look into her sexual harassment complaints. Id. at 1120.
119. Id. at 1120. As the partial dissent in Rost points out, “K.C. was attempting to communicate
what was happening to the counselor but did not have the words. One would think a trained middle
school counselor, faced with a mildly retarded young student who was severely distressed about being
‘bothered’ by some boys in her class, would ask the obvious follow-up question—in what way are they
bothering you?” Id. at 1127. (McConnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. K.C. suffered an acute psychotic episode as a result of her assaults and harassment in school.
Id. at 1118.
121. A not-insignificant proportion of sexual harassment and assault is perpetrated against very
young children: approximately 5 percent of sexual violence happens to five- and six-year-old children.
McDowell et al., supra note 1. For more stories of children using vague language, see Reese Dunklin &
Emily Schmall, Kindergarteners Among Youngest Schoolhouse Assault Victims, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(May 1, 2017), https://www.ap.org/explore/schoolhouse-sex-assault/kindergarteners-among-youngestschoolhouse-assault-victims.html [https://perma.cc/7F5K-AR9D] (reporting on a kindergartner who
reported a “gross thing”).
122. 315 F.3d 817, 822-23 (7th Cir. 2003); see also, e.g., McCoy v. Bd. of Educ., Columbus City
Sch., 515 Fed. App’x 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2013) (unpublished table decision) (finding elementary school
students’ repeated reports of inappropriate touching by teacher John Stroup over a six-year period—
including that Stroup touched, as one student wrote, the student’s “‘public’ areas”—insufficiently
precise to alert the school to “the nature and severity of Stroup's misconduct”).
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“vague and unspecific” to establish notice.123 Consequently, such young students
do not establish actual notice, and their Title IX claims fail.124
D. The Decision-Making Required by Title IX: Rendering the Law
“Inutile”
Courts thus require that students in K-through-twelve public schools not
only report their sexual harassment and abuse to access Title IX’s protections,
but also that they do so in unrealistically particular ways.125 Students must show
that the public schools know of the sexual harassment at particular times, that
particular officials receive that information, and that they have particular
information.126 Without such notice, schools have no obligation to respond to or
to address student sexual harassment.127 These particularized requirements,
therefore, preclude a substantial portion of claims from satisfying the actual
notice standard.128 The nature of reporting justifies some level of actual notice,
but these burdensome, highly specific notice requirements all but eviscerate the
law’s protective purpose.129
For students, that reporting thus involves overcoming nearly impossible
hurdles, including the weighing of numerous complicated factors. Students must
not only decide to report their sexual harassment and abuse to schools but also
must make their reports contemporaneously.130 Delays defeat claims.131 The
window of permissible reporting time varies to some extent among the federal

123. Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 822–23.
124. See supra notes 109, 111 and accompanying text.
125. See supra Parts I.A–C.
126. See supra Parts 0.A–C. To be sure, schools could learn of even this very specific information
by ways other than student reporting, including through observation or by a report from another person,
such as a parent, who knows about other harassment. Direct observation, however, is exceedingly rare.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Reporting from others requires either the same rare thirdparty observation or a student report to a third party that is then relayed to the school, which is nearly as
unusual. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Though uncommon, student reports to parents and
others do occur. See, e.g., Salazar v. S. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 953 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2017). For
all practical purposes, though, Title IX requires particularized student reporting. See supra Parts 0.A–C.
127. See supra Parts 0.A–C.
128. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
129. Even the application of any level of actual notice is subject to at least some debate. In his
dissent in Gebser, Justice Stevens disputed that the actual notice requirement was the inevitable
standard: “The majority’s inappropriate reliance on Title IX’s administrative enforcement scheme to
limit the availability of a damages remedy leads the Court to require . . . actual knowledge on the part of
‘an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute
corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf.’” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,
304 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also contended that “[a]s the Court
acknowledges . . . the two principal purposes that motivated the enactment of Title IX were: (1) ‘to avoid
the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices’; and (2) ‘to provide individual citizens
effective protection against those practices.’ It seems quite obvious that both of those purposes would
be served—not frustrated—by providing a damages remedy in a case of this kind” where the school did
not have actual notice. Id. at 301 (citations omitted).
130. See supra notes 54, 69, 76 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 54, 69, 76 and accompanying text.
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circuits, which further complicates matters.132 In short, students who are hesitant
to immediately report their sexual harassment cannot delay reporting for very
long, if at all, without risking running afoul of the actual notice standard.
Even if students timely report their sexual harassment, they must make their
reports to the correct administrative official in the school or school district.133
This requires that a student know whether, given the circumstances and context
of their particular sexual harassment, an assistant principal or principal is the
appropriate person to whom to report.134 If not, the student must report to the
school district-level employee who has authority over the perpetrator and who
could take corrective measures.135
Finally, even if students successfully overcome these reporting
requirements, they must still provide the proper amount of information when
making the report.136 Students have to report each instance, including the most
severe, of their sexual harassment and abuse.137 They also cannot use vague
language when reporting.138 No matter how much a student’s age or disability
status may hinder her language skills, reporting in language that is too vague will
not suffice.139 If students falter at any stage of this reporting process, then they
will be unable to access the protections of Title IX, and schools need not act to
protect the students from nor address their sexual harassment in school.140
Yet students rarely report properly.141 First, as the data on student reporting
demonstrates, half of students who experience sexual harassment never report it
132. See supra notes 54, 69, 76 and accompanying text.
133. See supra Part 0.B.
134. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
135. See Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 2011) (concluding six-year-old
Jherald’s report of a sexual assault by a school district bus driver had to be reported to a school districtlevel official to satisfy actual notice; a report to the principal was insufficient).
136. See supra Part 0.C.
137. See supra notes 109, 111 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text.
139. See supra Parts 0.A–C.
140. See supra Parts 0.A–C.
141. See supra Parts 0.A–C. Moreover, as limited a tool as Title IX is for students generally, it is
arguably far more limited for students of color and other marginalized students. Although older statistics
suggest that students of color report sexual harassment and assault at somewhat higher rates than white
students, they face the further discrimination of not being believed based on racial stereotypes. See Sonja
C. Tonnenson, “Hit It and Quit It”: Responses to Black Girls’ Victimization in Schools, 28 BERKELEY
J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 24 (2013) (“Teachers rarely invoke Title IX grievance procedures because they
often fail to label sexually harassing behavior by its proper name, especially due to implicit biases that
Black girls are unworthy or blameworthy.”). Similar points have been made in the context of Title VII
claims for sexual harassment in employment. E.g., Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 110
(“[A]ntidiscrimination law employs what courts deem an objective victim standard to analyze sexual
harassment claims. In so doing, the law ignores the complexities of how gender and racial subordination,
stereotype, and bias can shape a victim’s vulnerability to harassment, her credibility in the eyes of
factfinders, and others’ perceptions about whether she is harmed by the undesired conduct.”). Although
addressing the many intersectional ways marginalized students face such biases—including those based
on race, gender, socioeconomic status, and disability—is beyond the scope of this Article, the effects of
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at all.142 Second, even those students who do decide to report their sexual
harassment often miss some required reporting nuance and make legally
imperfect reports of sexual harassment and abuse.143 Students delay their
reporting.144 They also make their reports to teachers, school staff members, and
parents instead of to school and higher-level administrators.145 Finally, students
may fail to report the worst of their sexual harassment and abuse, or they may
use imprecise language when reporting.146 For all these reasons, students’
decision-making about reporting their sexual harassment and abuse regularly
conflicts with the reporting particularities required by courts under their
assessments of Title IX’s actual notice standard. Thus, they rarely have the
benefit of the protections Title IX exists to provide. Therefore, Title IX’s notice
requirements render the law, as Justice Stevens predicted in his dissent in
Gebser, largely “inutile.”147
such intersectional biases on student sexual harassment reporting cannot go unstated. See, e.g., Rost ex
rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1118 (holding that student K.C., who
had an intellectual disability related to a brain injury, reported her sexual harassment in insufficiently
precise language to make out a successful Title IX claim); see also supra notes 116, 118–120.
142. HILL & KEARL, supra note 14, at 3.
143. See supra Parts 0.A–C.
144. See supra notes 54, 69 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that even though
six-year-old Jherald’s mother made successful reports to a schoolteacher and school social worker, as
well as attempted reports to the school principal, all those efforts still failed to satisfy the actual notice
standard).
146. See supra notes 109, 111, 121 and accompanying text.
147. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 304 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Presumably, few Title IX plaintiffs who have been victims of intentional discrimination will be able
to recover damages under this exceedingly high standard. The Court fails to recognize that its holding
will virtually ‘render inutile causes of action authorized by Congress through a decision that no remedy
is available.’” (citation omitted)). That said, Title IX is not the exclusive remedy for students suffering
sexual harassment and assault in school. Claims of sex discrimination can also be made by way of a
§ 1983 action for sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable
Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 258 (2009). However, those claims are narrower than Title IX claims in that
a student “must show that the harassment was the result of municipal custom, policy, or practice.” Id. at
257–58. Tort law offers another possible recourse for the students who cannot satisfy Title IX’s notice
requirements, but tort relief may be limited by generous defenses and immunities. 5 JAMES A. RAPP,
EDUCATION LAW § 12.07 (2016). Many states’ laws offer schools immunity from liability for acts of
their employees when the acts constitute discretionary functions. Id. Even absent statutory immunity,
schools may still evade liability by asserting any number of generous defenses. Id. § 12.14(5). For
example, negligent supervision claims require “standards of knowledge [that] are significant and . . . a
foreseeable risk of harm.” Id. § 12.14(5)(b)(iii). Schools, therefore, successfully defend based on lack of
knowledge or foreseeability. E.g., Conklin v. Saugerties Cent. Sch. Dist., 106 A.D.3d 1424 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013) (finding no liability in tort for a school district when one student assaulted another, even
though the school knew the assaulting student had threatened to fight). Similarly, when facing
respondeat superior or other vicarious liability claims, schools can avoid liability by showing that an
employee’s actions fell outside the scope of liability. RAPP, supra, § 12.14(4)(b). Further, neither tort
nor criminal law provide a remedy against the school or school district as an institution; these options
thus hold less, if any, promise of prompting systemic reforms to better protect students from sexual
harassment. For thoughtful analyses on the limits of tort law to remedy similar kinds of harms to children
in schools, see Samantha Neiman et al., Bullying: A State of Affairs, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 603, 627 (2012)
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II.
THE TITLE IX PARADOX
In establishing this particularized notice regime, courts engage in an
essentially unilateral assessment of notice.148 They inquire into whether public
schools receive sufficient information about students’ sexual harassment,
without regard for children’s capacity to provide such information.149 Empirical
evidence, however, has demonstrated that children naturally have substantial
trouble complying with these notice requirements.150 Both behavioral
psychology and developmental neuroscience indicate that children face
significant obstacles in making such complex decisions as to whether to report
their sexual harassment at all, let alone in the particularized ways required by
Title IX jurisprudence.151 Cognitive heuristics and their still-developing brains
inhibit this decision-making.152 This Section explores cognitive heuristics and
children’s nascent neurodevelopment, describing how they impede children’s
ability to report their sexual harassment and comply with courts’ stringent Title
IX notice standard.
As a threshold and purely descriptive matter, a student’s failure to report
their sexual harassment represents what behavioral psychologists call a judgment
or decision error insofar as it does nothing to compel schools to address the
harassment.153 Such decisions mean that students have no protection under Title
(“Even when conduct by a school official satisfies the elements of a common law cause of action, various
forms of immunity from tort liability often serve as shields to school districts and/or individual school
officials.”), Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1079, 1145–47 (2002) (explaining the ways state law immunity bars claims of disability harassment in
schools), and Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and
Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 641 (2004) (offering a
comprehensive analysis of limitations of tort law as a remedy for bullying in school). Nothing in these
analyses suggests that sexual harassment would be immune to these problems.
148. See supra Parts 0.A–C.
149. Courts do not consider why students might not have reported their sexual harassment. Even
when presented with evidence suggesting such reasons, they do not grapple with it. E.g., Doe v. Bd. of
Educ., 605 F. App’x 159, 163–64, 168 (4th Cir. 2015) (failing to consider in its assessment of actual
notice student J.D.’s explanation that he told then recanted his story “because he was ‘nervous,’” thought
the school would believe the perpetrator over him, and “‘thought that [changing my story] would just
be the end of it’”); Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 615, 617–18 (7th Cir. 2014) (failing to consider in its
assessment of actual notice that student Jane Doe “declined to tell [school counselor] Lakatos who
harassed her on the bus, explaining that she wanted to put the issue behind her”).
150. See infra Parts 0.A–B.
151. See infra Parts 0.A–B.
152. See infra Parts 0.A–B.
153. See, e.g., R. Scott Tindale, Decision Errors Made by Individuals and Groups, in
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP DECISION MAKING 109 (N. John Castellan, Jr., ed., 1993). In behavioral
psychology, a rational decision is defined as one that is internally consistent. Valerie F. Reyna & Frank
Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1, 4 (2006). For
example, if one has an evidentiary basis for predicting a negative or risky outcome from an activity, such
as the serious health-harming effects from smoking, then the decision to avoid the activity is rational.
Id. at 4. In this sense, because students must report their sexual harassment to trigger school action, their
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IX, and that schools need not act to protect them from or address their sexual
harassment.154 The consequences of these decisions, therefore, are profound.155
Decisional errors themselves, though, are common.156 Behavioral psychology
demonstrates that both children and adults regularly make inadvertent judgment
errors by deploying cognitive heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to make
decisions.157 Further, neuroscientific research reveals that children’s immature
brain development also inhibits their decision-making.158 So while children’s
decision-making, like that of adults, is prone to judgment errors because of
cognitive heuristics, children’s decision-making faces a second, additional set of
obstacles stemming from their developmental immaturities. By requiring
children to make decisions to report their sexual harassment and abuse, courts
create a paradox for children, requiring them to do what they often cannot in
order to enjoy the protections of Title IX.
A. Two Cognitive Heuristics: The Availability Heuristic and the Affect
Heuristic
In order to understand how both children and adults routinely make
decisional errors, the ways the brain generally makes decisions must be
understood first. The human brain relies on two systems for decision-making.159
“System One” is automatic, experiential, intuitive, and susceptible to judgment
errors.160 In assessing things like the probability of events, people frequently rely

failure to report operates as a decisional error in that it does not trigger that school action. Again, this
point is purely descriptive. Whether this failure to report sexual harassment normatively constitutes an
error in judgment is a different question. In the Title VII context, other scholars have persuasively argued
it is not, and those arguments have salience here. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
156. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 25–26. The use of heuristics results in part from the effort
and consequent fatigue of thinking carefully through decisions. As Kahneman describes: “[Studies have]
repeatedly found that an effort of will or self-control is tiring; if you have had to force yourself to do
something, you are less willing or less able to exert self-control when the next challenge comes around.
The phenomenon has been named ego depletion.” Id. at 41–42.
157. Janis E. Jacobs & Paul A. Klaczynski, The Development of Judgment and Decision Making
During Childhood and Adolescence, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 145, 147–48 (2002)
(“[E]ven young children use many of the same rules of thumb, or heuristics, that adults use in their
decisions and are susceptible to many of the same judgment biases[,] . . . [and] judgment heuristics and
other biases appear to be linked to increases in knowledge (e.g., stereotypes) and to preservation of social
beliefs (e.g., religious beliefs). Thus, the number of heuristics and the situations in which they are applied
increase with age.”).
158. See infra Part 0.B.
159. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 20–21, 25–26; Dustin Albert & Laurence Steinberg,
Judgment and Decision Making in Adolescence, 21 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 211, 215 (2011); Paul A.
Klaczynski, Analytic and Heuristic Processing Influences on Adolescent Reasoning and DecisionMaking, 72 CHILD DEV. 844 (2001); Reyna & Farley, supra note 153, at 15.
160. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23; Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 215; Klaczynski, supra
note 159, at 844; Reyna & Farley, supra note 153, at 15.
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on the first system and make automatic, intuitive decisions.161 These quick
decisions are useful, but they are also prone to mistakes.162 “System Two” makes
decisions more slowly, deliberatively, and analytically.163 It can referee the
decisions of System One but doing so takes conscious effort.164 Consequently,
System Two does not always intercede in System One’s decisions.165 Therefore,
seemingly good but still incorrect or even irrational decisions automatically
happen without any intervention by the deliberative brain.166
One way that these judgment errors happen is by the use of cognitive
heuristics.167 Daniel Kahneman, who with his research partner, Amos Tversky,
pioneered substantial research on judgment heuristics, defines a heuristic as “a
simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to
difficult questions.”168 System One deploys heuristics to make judgments in the
face of such questions, and System Two regularly allows those judgments to go
unchecked because they seem adequate.169 For example, when asked the
complicated question “How happy are you with your life these days?,”
individuals are prone to instead answer the far simpler question “What is my
mood right now?”170 Individuals’ feelings about their present mood may or may
161. For example, System One routinely detects “that one object is more distant than another,”
“complete[s] the phrase ‘bread and . . . ,’” and “detect[s] hostility in a voice.” KAHNEMAN, supra note
23, at 21.
162. Jolls et al., supra note 27, at 1477 (noting that although cognitive heuristics are “useful on
average (which explains how they become adopted), they lead to errors in particular circumstances.”).
163. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 21 (describing how System Two “allocates attention to the
effortful mental activities that demand it”); Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 215; Klaczynski,
supra note 159, at 844; Reyna & Farley, supra note 153, at 15. One of System Two’s main tasks is to
“monitor and control thoughts ‘suggested’” by System One. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 44. This
work—attending to and filtering the automatic, intuitive judgments of the first system—is not easy and
takes effort. Id. at 41–44. It thus frequently fails to do so. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
165. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 24, 44.
166. Id. at 24, 44, 98; see also Jolls et al., supra note 27, at 1477 (discussing the simultaneous
utility and incorrectness of cognitive heuristics).
167. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 89, 97–98. The use of heuristics in judgment is a part of what
scholars have called “bounded rationality,” or “the obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not
infinite.” Jolls et al., supra note 27, at 1477; see also id. at 1480 (“[B]ounded rationality as it relates to
decisionmaking behavior will come into play whenever actors are valuing outcomes.”).
168. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 98; see also supra note 162 and accompanying text.
169. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 98. System One’s use of a heuristic involves the
substitution of a simpler question for a more complicated or difficult one. Id. at 26. As Kahneman puts
it, “[i]f a satisfactory answer to a hard question is not found quickly, System 1 will find a related question
that is easier and will answer it.” Id. at 97. “When all goes smoothly, which is most of the time, System
2 adopts the suggestions of System 1 with little or no modification. You generally believe your
impressions and act on your desires, and that is fine—usually.” Id. at 24. Errors, however, do happen.
For example, research shows that people quickly judge whether a person is friendly and trustworthy by
their facial features. Id. at 90. A dominant chin and a frown indicate a person is threatening and
untrustworthy. Id. Thus, quick, seconds-long System One decisions are made on that basis. Id. While
these assessments are useful in evaluating whether and how to interact with strangers, they are prone to
error. Id. A person’s smile may be fake, and people with stronger chins can certainly be friendly and
trustworthy. Id.
170. Id. at 98.
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not be adequate to address the more complicated question.171 Regardless, System
Two will likely allow System One to use the individual’s current mood to
provide the answer.172 As Kahneman notes, people “may not even notice that
[they] did not answer the question . . . asked . . . [or] that the target question was
difficult, because an intuitive answer to it came readily to mind.”173
Children, like adults, use cognitive heuristics in decision-making.174
Research shows that even children as young as four use cognitive heuristics.175
Further, research demonstrates that the use of some heuristics increases as
children mature and their social schemas become more developed; this makes it
easier for them to automatically rely on those schema for decision-making.176
Two such heuristics particularly bear on children’s decision-making in the Title
IX context: the availability heuristic and the affect heuristic.177 These two mental
shortcuts have formidable capacity to undermine the decision-making called for
by Title IX jurisprudence.
1. The Availability (or Unavailability) Heuristic and Decisions About
Reporting Sexual Harassment and Abuse
The availability heuristic is the mechanism by which people judge the
probability or frequency of events by the ease or difficulty with which
information about similar events comes to mind.178 That is, instead of judging

171. Id. at 98–99.
172. Id. at 99.
173. Id.
174. Likewise, the field of psychology that studies judgment and decision-making in adolescents
“has seen widespread adoption dual-process models of cognitive development. These models describe
two relatively independent modes of information processing, typically contrasting an analytic
(deliberative, controlled, reasoned, “cold”) system with an experiential (intuitive, automatic, reactive,
“hot”) system.” Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 212 (citation omitted); see also Reyna & Farley,
supra note 153, at 15.
175. Jacobs & Klaczynski, supra note 157, at 147. Children begin to use different heuristics at
different ages. Id. at 148. For example, as children age in adolescence, they “show less . . . use of the
‘sunk cost’ fallacy,” whereby they figuratively throw good money after bad, but they show more “use
of the representativeness heuristic . . . [or] the tendency to rely on salient features of a scenario rather
than base rate information to inform likelihood judgments.” Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 215.
These findings upend previous understandings of children’s rational development. Id. at 214. Prior to
the mid-1990s, psychologists believed that child and adolescent decision-making developed along a
“linear trajectory progressing from childhood intuition to mature, deliberative thinking in adulthood.”
Id. To the contrary, even adults reach no such end; they too regularly make judgment errors. Id. Indeed,
“developmental studies suggest that certain heuristics and biases become more prevalent over the course
of childhood and adolescence.” Id. That is, “[d]espite increasing competence in reasoning, some biases
in judgment and decision making grow with age, producing more ‘irrational’ violations of coherence
among adults than among adolescents and younger children.” Reyna & Farley, supra note 153, at 34.
176. Jacobs & Klaczynski, supra note 157, at 147–48; see also supra note 156 and accompanying
text. Dustin Albert and Lawrence Steinberg, who have done substantial research child and adolescent
brain development, write that “if the road of normative development leads to logically rigorous decision
making, most adults fail to reach the destination.” Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 214.
177. See infra Parts 0.A–B.
178. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 129; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23, at 208.
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probability based on substantively relevant information, a person makes a
decision based on the ease of retrieving apparently needed information from
memory.179 The availability heuristic thus substitutes one question for another.180
It substitutes a predictive assessment, such as “what should I do” or “what will
happen,” for an assessment about the ease with which examples of like scenarios
come to mind.181 For example, in judging the probability of a particular couple’s
divorce, a person using the availability heuristic will think it more likely that the
particular couple will divorce if the person can easily generate examples of
similar couples who also got divorced.182
Behavioral psychologists have repeatedly demonstrated that such a
prediction is based on the ease of retrieving the examples from memory, leading
to errors in adults.183 Because the ease of coming up with relevant examples of
similar divorced couples has virtually no bearing on whether a particular couple
will actually divorce, the availability heuristic causes judgment errors.184
Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated both that the ease of retrieving examples
formed the basis of predictive judgments and the consequent judgment errors in
one of their first groundbreaking research studies.185 They asked participants to
listen to recorded lists of thirty-nine names.186 Some participants heard a list with
the names of nineteen famous women and twenty less famous men; others heard
a list of names of nineteen famous men and twenty less famous women.187 By a
large majority, the participants judged the lists containing more famous names
of women to have more women on the list, even though those lists in fact had
fewer women’s names.188 Likewise, they judged the lists containing the names
of more famous men to have more men listed, when they in fact had fewer.189 In
other words, the greater ease of remembering famous names led people to

179. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23, at 208. The study of the availability heuristic breaks
down decisions into two component parts: (1) the ease of retrieving information by which to make a
judgment and (2) the content, or substance, of that information itself. Id.
180. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 130. Cass Sunstein, among others, has argued persuasively
that the availability heuristic plays a dramatic role in risk regulation, resulting in misguided rules and
laws. In this view, the strength of this heuristic’s effect is such that “[a]s with George Orwell’s ‘equal
animals’ of which ‘some animals are more equal than others,’ one heuristic is more fundamental than
the rest—at least in social contexts where people, lacking reliable information of their own, look to
others for interpretations of events.” Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 711.
181. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 130.
182. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23, at 228.
183. Psychologists have shown that people “believe that they use their bicycles less often after
recalling many rather than few instances; are less confident in a choice when they are asked to produce
more arguments to support it; are less confident that an event was avoidable after listing more ways it
could have been avoided; are less impressed by a car after listing many of its advantages.” KAHNEMAN,
supra note 23, at 133.
184. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23, at 208, 228.
185. Id. at 207.
186. Id. at 220. They read the names one-by-one with a pause between names. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 221. Eighty out of ninety-nine participants made this judgment error. Id.
189. Id.
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erroneously judge lists with more famous women or men to have more women
or men, respectively, overall.190 The ease of recall led to a judgment error.191
Further, and crucially for the decision to report sexual harassment or not,
psychologists have demonstrated that the inverse is also true: adults use an
unavailability heuristic.192 When individuals have difficulty generating salient
examples about how to make a decision, they make negative predictions or
judgments.193 In one study, researchers asked female subjects to list either six or
twelve examples of their own assertiveness and unassertiveness.194 Those who
listed six examples reported having an easier time identifying examples than the
people who had to list twelve.195 The people who listed only six examples also
rated themselves as more assertive than the people who listed twelve examples
of their own assertiveness.196 The difficulty of generating examples led the
people in the list-of-twelve group to be significantly less likely to identify
themselves as assertive despite identifying more evidence of their own
assertiveness.197
Children also use the availability, or unavailability, heuristic when making
predictive judgments.198 In one experiment demonstrating the unavailability
heuristic, researchers asked children aged four, six, and eight to generate either

190. Id. at 220–21. The availability heuristic can play out in other settings, too. Tversky and
Kahneman offered the example of a clinical psychologist assessing the suicidality of a patient. Id. at 228.
They explained that the difficult judgment about the likelihood of a suicide attempt will be substituted
for relevant other examples that come to mind. Id. If the psychologist could easily retrieve from memory
examples of similar patients who committed or attempted to commit suicide—which would be easy to
do should such examples exist because they are “dramatic and salient”—the psychologist could quite
easily judge this patient also likely to commit suicide. Id. Yet such a judgment is irrational given that
relatively few patients with depression actually do attempt suicide. Id. at 229.
191. Id. at 221. Studies of the availability heuristic have further refined its use and application.
One such study concluded that ease of recall is paramount when the assessment is about the self; if the
assessment is about others, the content has more influence. Eugene M. Caruso, Use of Experienced
Retrieval Ease in Self and Social Judgments, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 148, 148–50 (2008).
In this study, psychologist Eugene Caruso asked one group of college students to list two or eight
examples of their own assertiveness and another group to list two or eight examples of the average
college student’s assertiveness. Id. at 149. He found that those who listed fewer examples of their own
assertiveness judged themselves more assertive. Id. at 150. However, the participants who listed more
examples of the average student’s assertiveness judged the average student more assertive. Id. at 150.
Caruso concluded that because judgments about others may feel inherently more difficult than
judgments about the self, people might be especially likely to rely on the number of instances instead of
the ease of retrieval. Id. at 149.
192. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 133; Norbert Schwarz et al., Ease of Retrieval as
Information: Another Look at the Availability Heuristic, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195,
199–200 (1991).
193. Schwarz et al., supra note 192, at 199–200.
194. Id. at 199.
195. Id. at 200.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Jacobs & Klaczynski, supra note 157, at 147–48; see also infra notes 199, 201 and
accompanying text.
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a short or long list of boys’ or girls’ names.199 The results replicated the results
of the adult version of the study. Even the four-year-old children who generated
more names, but with difficulty, judged their memory for names as worse than
the children who generated fewer names more easily.200 That is, the children
judged their memories by ease of recall instead of by the substance and volume
of that recall.201
In the Title IX context, the decision-making required of children when
reporting sexual harassment and abuse is susceptible to the availability, or more
precisely, the unavailability heuristic. As other scholars who write on the topic
of heuristics in the law note, “whenever actors in the legal system are called upon
to assess the probability of an uncertain event,” judgment heuristics come into
play.202 When deciding whether to report sexual harassment and assault, children
are those actors in the legal system, and they must make predictive judgments,
including what will happen if they make a report and how to do it.203 Because
children have little information to draw on when making those decisions, their
inevitable difficulty in generating that information leaves them susceptible to
negative predictions about reporting the sexual harassment and abuse. Those

199. Marie Geurten et al., Less is More: The Availability Heuristic in Early Childhood, 33 BRIT.
J. DEV. PSYCHOL. 405, 407 (2015). The number of names each group had to generate varied by age, so
the shorter, easier list as well as the longer, harder list for a four-year-old were both shorter than the
corresponding lists for six- and eight-year-olds. Id.
200. Id. at 409. Here, researchers asked seventy-one four-, six-, and eight-year-old children to
generate a list of boys’ or girls’ names. Id. at 407. Some four-year-olds were told to list four names; the
others were told to list eight. Id. Six-year-olds were similarly told to list either six or ten names, and
eight-year-olds were told to list either eight or twelve names. Id. In each age category, the first group—
the group asked to list fewer names—judged themselves to know more names than the latter. Id. at 408.
Twice as many children made this judgment in the eight-year-old group; ten times as many made this
judgment in the six-year-old group; and three times as many made this judgment in the four-year-old
group. Id. at 408.
201. Id. at 409. Researchers have replicated these findings in other children, confirming that the
availability heuristic is acquired and used at an early age. Mary Davies & Peter A. White, Use of the
Availability Heuristic by Children, 12 BRIT. J. DEV. PSYCHOL. 503, 503–05 (1994). For example, in one
study, seven- and ten-year-old students each heard a list of names: some of animal characters, some of
human characters. Id. at 504. Each list had nineteen names: nine famous names from one category and
ten less famous names from the other. Id. When asked whether the list contained more animals or people,
twice as many ten-year-old students inaccurately reported that the slightly smaller category with more
famous names was larger, and nearly six times as many seven-year-old students did. Id.
202. Jolls et al., supra note 27, at 1480.
203. As Cass Sunstein argued, “the availability heuristic is most important for purposes of
understanding the law relating to risks.” Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,
1041 (2003). Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler made the further point that “the availability heuristic can lead
to under- as well as over-regulation. People sometimes (although not always) underestimate the
likelihood of low-probability events because these threats simply do not make it onto people’s ‘radar
screens.” Jolls et al., supra note 27, at 1519. In the Title IX context, the threat is not one of large-scale
disaster but one of personal disaster that may result from offering information about one’s harm into the
void of the unknown. That threat can leave students disinclined to report their sexual harassment. See
infra notes 215–223 and accompanying text.
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negative predictions can easily inhibit or prevent reporting both generally and in
the particularized ways that courts’ interpretations of Title IX require.204
Children have little such information to draw on for two reasons. First,
students are unlikely to directly observe or otherwise learn about what has
happened to other students who have reported sexual harassment.205 Federal
privacy laws governing and protecting the privacy of student discipline records
keep any information about those complaints, or complaints of any other kinds
of harms in school, from being publicly available.206 Even were the information
not protected by law from disclosure, the extraordinarily low number of reports
of sexual harassment and assault means that any particular school may have
handled such reports only rarely, if ever.207 Students, therefore, might have no
access to such information on which to draw.208
Second, children often have little or no guidance from the schools about
how to make a proper, legally sufficient report of sexual harassment. To make
such a report, students must comply with the nuanced decision-making that Title
IX’s actual notice standard requires.209 But it is nearly impossible for students to
know to report at particular times, to particular people, and, in doing so, to
provide particular information.210 Unless they are reading the various federal
court opinions on Title IX, they have almost no way of learning these
204. See supra notes 191, 200–201 and accompanying text.
205. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
206. The Family Education Rights Privacy Act (FERPA) prohibits the disclosure of student
records, including student disciplinary records, without the consent of a parent or eligible student except
in certain limited circumstances. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a) (2019). Those circumstances include disclosures
for the purposes of public health, but do not include disclosures to the survivors of sexual harassment.
See id. Although school staff members of course also sexually harass and assault students, they do so at
far lower numbers. See MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 2047. Thus, FERPA’s privacy requirements protect
the large majority of information about what happens to all perpetrators of sexual harassment and assault
of schoolchildren. That said, public employee records are also sometimes protected by state laws. For
example, Washington’s open records law has been interpreted to mean that “a teacher’s identity should
be released . . . only when alleged sexual misconduct has been substantiated or when that teacher’s
conduct results in some form of discipline.” Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. #405, 189
P.3d 139, 153 (Wash. 2008). Although the fact of an investigation into a teacher’s misconduct may be
disclosed, the details of it may not be. See Predisik v. Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81, 346 P.3d 737, 742
(Wash. 2015). California courts have also allowed for disclosure of teacher records when a teacher was
reprimanded for sexual misconduct but not for other disclosures, such as teacher ratings. See L.A.
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. App. 4th 222 (2014); Marken v. Santa Monica–Malibu
Unified Sch. Dist., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1250 (2012). Teacher records, therefore, may also be protected
depending on the stage at which any investigation into misconduct is in. Further, accessing those records,
even when they are subject to open records laws, may very well involve a legal battle. Importantly, the
point here is not to argue against the privacy of student records or to take a position on when to disclose
teachers’ records. The point, rather, is that getting information about what happens to students and
teachers accused of sexual harassment and assault is generally not possible in the case of students and
difficult in the case of teachers.
207. Simply because student sexual harassment goes largely underreported, any given school
might never have responded to a report. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
209. See supra Part 0.D.
210. See supra Part 0.D.
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requirements. Although the U.S. Department of Education has admonished
schools to develop Title IX policies and procedures, the guidance is at best
general and often vague.211 For example, it lays out five compliance steps that
public schools should take under Title IX.212 These include developing
procedures for reporting violations of Title IX in age-appropriate language.213
However, the Department of Education says nothing about what those
procedures should include or how the procedures themselves might be tailored
to the age of the student audience.214 This guidance, consequently, offers
substantial flexibility but little specificity about how much information is needed
to ensure that students know how to comply with courts’ jurisprudence on actual
notice.
This flexibility can also lead to the dissemination of incorrect information.
In Hill ex rel. BHJ v. Cundiff, in which a student was raped when she was used
as bait by a teacher’s aide in a plot to catch another student in the act of sexual
harassment, the school’s Title IX procedures called for students to report to,
among other people, teachers.215 Yet such a report would not have satisfied Title
IX’s actual notice requirement.216 Unsurprisingly, therefore, public school
districts offer little or no specific direction in their individual Title IX procedural
guidance materials.217 Thus, students face an informational void that inhibits
211. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE 4–5 (2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-title-ix-coordinators-guide-201504.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X92D-VAW8].
212. Id.
213. Id. at 4.
214. See id. Additionally, this guide suggests that the school’s Title IX coordinator should
communicate with parents and students about these procedures but provides no guidance on when, how,
or how often this communication should occur. Id. at 5.
215. 797 F.3d 948, 957 (11th Cir. 2015).
216. See supra Part 0.B.
217. Further, as in Hill, students appear to have had no useful sources to draw on in order to
determine how or to whom to report sexual harassment. See 797 F.3d at 957. In addition to the school
district’s erroneous Title IX procedures, the court noted that the principal could not “remember the
identity of the Title IX coordinator in 2010; [did] not know how employees would discover the identity
of the Title IX coordinator; and testified students were not told the identity of the Title IX coordinator.
Rather than give each teacher a copy of the sexual harassment policy, a large binder containing the entire
Policy Manual was kept on file at the media center and principals’ office.” 797 F.3d at 957. The same
procedural obscurity exists in other, large school districts. For example, Los Angeles Unified School
District’s Title IX policy simply states that complaints of sexual harassment should be made to the Title
IX coordinator within sixty days. Title IX - Sex Based Nondiscrimination Statute, L.A. UNIFIED SCH.
DIST., https://achieve.lausd.net/Page/3654 [https://perma.cc/J62C-9TG7]. It does not state who the
coordinator is, when or how such complaints should be made, or what information should be provided.
In another large school district, the City School District of the City of New York, the complaint must be
made through an online form. Non-Discrimination Policy, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www.schools.nyc.gov/about-us/vision-and-mission/non-discrimination-policy
[https://perma.cc/5DAP-WRK7]. While that form prompts some specificity of information by inquiring
where the harassment occurred and when it happened, a student would have to have access to the Internet
to use it and then be able to find it to even make a complaint. See Complaint Form, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF
EDUC., https://www.nycenet.edu/oeo [https://perma.cc/PU5U-W2RF]. Unsurprisingly, then, at least
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their decision-making process for reporting sexual harassment and assault under
Title IX.
Lacking this information, children, prone to the use of the availability and
unavailability heuristics, tend to not report their sexual harassment.218 Instead of
answering the complicated question of whether to report their sexual harassment,
they can substitute simpler questions such as whether they know how to report
or whether they know what has happened to other students who have reported
sexual harassment.219 Students’ lack of information about these simpler
questions can easily lead them to a negative conclusion about the question they
are really answering: whether to report their sexual harassment.220
The decision-making of student Alida Star Gebser, the plaintiff in Gebser
v. Lago Vista Independent School District, offers an apt example. Alida Star
Gebser engaged in a sexual relationship with a teacher in her high school.221 She
never reported the abuse, and it was only discovered when a police officer found
Gebser and the teacher having sex.222 Explaining her failure to report the abuse
despite knowing it was inappropriate, Gebser said “she was uncertain how to
react.”223 She therefore substituted the question of whether she knew what to do
for the far more complicated question of what to do about her sexual harassment.
In other words, she relied on the availability heuristic to make her decision, and
it inhibited her report.
2. The Affect Heuristic and Decisions About Reporting Sexual
Harassment and Abuse
Even in the unusual event that students do have information available to
inform their decision about how to report sexual harassment and abuse, a second
heuristic—the affect heuristic—can still inhibit the kind of decision-making
Title IX requires.224 The affect heuristic involves the use of emotions to make

one study has found that even identifying a school Title IX coordinator in public schools can be difficult
or impossible. See Elizabeth J. Meyer, et al., Title IX Coordinators as Street-Level Bureaucrats in U.S.
Schools: Challenges Addressing Sex Discrimination in the #MeToo Era, 26 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS
ARCHIVES, no. 68, 2018, at 1, 7.
218. For example, students who have faced some of the most severe sexual assaults, including
rape, hesitate to report it. See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159, 161–63 (4th Cir. 2015)
(discussing how student J.D. did not report for almost a year that he was sexually assaulted by another
student); Davis ex rel. M.D. v. Carmel Clay Sch., 570 F. App’x 602, 603–04 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing
how student M.D. did not report his daily sexual assaults and harassment, though they went on for
months).
219. See supra notes 201, 202, 207 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 207, 218 and accompanying text.
221. 524 U.S. 274, 277–78 (1998).
222. Id. at 278.
223. Id. Gebser also said that she wanted to “continue having [the teacher] as a teacher.” Id.
224. Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 216–17. It also affects adults. Paul Slovic, Trust,
Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 689,
694 (1999) [hereinafter Slovic, Trust].
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decisions.225 Like the availability heuristic, it automatically substitutes a
complex evaluation for a different, less difficult evaluation.226 It deputizes an
assessment of affect for the more complicated predictive assessment about what
to do in a given scenario.227
When relying on the affect heuristic, instead of weighing various
advantages, disadvantages, and other factors to determine what to do, individuals
assess how they feel about the situation to make the substantive decision.228 The
better someone feels about a question or an issue, the lower they perceive the
risk or negative outcomes to be.229 Likewise, the worse someone feels about an
issue or question, the worse they perceive the risk or negative outcomes to be.230

225. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 138–89; Slovic, Trust, supra note 224, at 694.
226. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 139; Slovic, Trust, supra note 224, at 695. Affect “plays a
central role in . . . [the] ‘dual-process theories’ of thinking, knowing, and information processing.” Paul
Slovic, Cigarette Smokers: Rational Actors or Rational Fools?, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, AND
POLICY 97, 99 (Paul Slovic ed., 2001) [hereinafter Slovic, Cigarette Smokers]. Risk management is also
dependent on trust, which is fragile. Slovic, Trust, supra note 224, at 698. Trust-destroying events are
more visible and salient than trust-building events. Id.
227. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 139; Slovic, Trust, supra note 224, at 695. Affect, as used
here, means a positive or negative feeling. Behavioral psychologists generally define affect as a form of
emotion by which individuals assess something as positive or negative. Slovic, Trust, supra note 224,
at 694 (defining affect as “a subtle form of emotion . . . [that is] positive (like) or negative (dislike)
evaluative feeling toward an external stimulus”).
228. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 139–41; Slovic, Trust, supra note 224, at 695. It is easier and
more expedient to rely on affect to make a judgment than to retrieve as much information as possible
from memory to evaluate each option’s advantages and disadvantages. Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent
Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 DUKE L.J. 1133, 1136 (1998) [hereinafter Slovic, Adolescent Smokers].
229. Slovic, Trust, supra note 224, at 695. Kahneman called this phenomenon “associative
coherence,” and consistent affect is an element of it: positive feelings translate into an assessment of low
risk. KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 139.
230. Slovic, Trust, supra note 224, at 695. For example, in one study, individuals’ feelings about
a nuclear waste disposal site, as shown by their response to an image of such a site, strongly correlated
to their decision about whether to vote for or against it. Id. 90 percent of people who felt negatively
about the site said they would vote against it without regard for whether any data or substantive evidence
showed such a site to be a risk. Id. The affect heuristic is so strong that even experts in their own fields
have demonstrated use of the affect heuristic over their own specialized knowledge. KAHNEMAN, supra
note 23, at 139 (noting that even toxicologists “found little benefit in substances or technologies that
they thought risky, and vice versa”). In addition, when individuals rely on the affect heuristic to make
decisions, they make little or no probability judgments. Sunstein, supra note 203, at 1044–45. Cass
Sunstein, who has extensively studied heuristics in legal regulation, called this failure to judge
probability “probability neglect.” Id. Sunstein identified how emotions may either lead to neglecting
probabilities or influence their assessment in other ways that do not correspond to the actual
probabilities. Id. To the extent individuals do make some sort of probability assessment, their probability
assessments are distorted such that they overweigh small probabilities and underweigh large
probabilities. Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the
Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 185–87 (2001). In an experiment in which
researchers asked participants how much they would pay for a coupon for a European vacation or a
tuition payment, both valued at $500 and both having a 1 percent chance of redemption, the participants
on average were willing to pay four times as much for the affect-rich vacation coupon as for the affectpoor tuition coupon. Id. at 187. In other words, the individuals overweighed the chance of redeeming
the affect-rich European vacation coupon by a factor of four. Id. They did so even though, as a rational
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When children use the affect heuristic to make predictions and decisions,
they consult their feelings about a situation.231 In studies of smoking among
children and adolescents, for example, how children feel about the decision to
smoke affects, even dictates, both their judgment about whether to smoke and
their assessments of its probable effects.232 Their positive feelings about
smoking—be they feelings of excitement, the thrill of defying adults who warn
of the risks, or inclusion in a group, among others—lead them to decide to
smoke.233
Because reporting sexual harassment and assault is an affect-rich, or
emotionally laden, area of decision-making, students are susceptible to using the
affect heuristic when making decisions regarding what to do about their sexual
harassment and assault.234 Students report many negative emotions associated
with the notion of reporting their sexual harassment and abuse.235 They report
fear of social rejection, condemnation,236 and being blamed;237 mistrust about
matter, that coupon had the exact same monetary value and probability of redemption as the affect-poor
tuition coupon. Id. The same finding holds when the question involves negative-affect scenarios. Id. at
188. In one experiment involving negative affect, participants were asked how much they would pay to
avoid risk of electric shock and how much they would pay to avoid a twenty-dollar penalty. Id. In both
cases, the negative result had the same 1 percent chance. Id. Yet the median price paid to avoid the
negative affect-rich shock was many times larger than the median payment to avoid the twenty-dollar
penalty: seven dollars to one dollar, respectively. Id. In other words, in the negative-affect scenario,
people overweighed the small possibility of having a shock to the point of paying nearly several times
as much to avoid it as to avoid the affect-poor twenty-dollar penalty. Id. Individuals still overweigh small
probabilities and underweigh large ones. Id.
231. See Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 317; Slovic, Trust, supra note 224.
232. Slovic, Adolescent Smokers, supra note 228, at 1148; Slovic, Cigarette Smokers, supra note
226, at 122.
233. Slovic, Cigarette Smokers, supra note 226, at 122. As Paul Slovic compellingly states,
“young smokers act[] experientially in the sense of giving little or no conscious thought to risks or to the
amount of smoking they will be doing. Instead, they are driven by the affective impulses of the moment,
enjoying smoking as something new and exciting, a way to have fun with their friends.” Paul Slovic et
al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thought About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality,
24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 319 (2004); see also Slovic, Cigarette Smokers, supra note 226, at 112 (“Far
more [young] beginning smokers were thinking about ‘trying something new and exciting’ than were
thinking about health.”). In addition, and for the same affect-related reasons, children and adolescents
judge the short-term harmful effects to be minimal or non-existent. Slovic, Cigarette Smokers, supra
note 226, at 110. Indeed, children believe the short-term use of cigarettes is safe, and they conclude that
they will stop smoking before any health-harming effects happen. See id.; Slovic, Adolescent Smokers,
supra note 228, at 1141. To the contrary, however, research shows that children actually get addicted to
nicotine quickly and struggle to stop smoking after even short-term cigarette use. Slovic, Cigarette
Smokers, supra note 226, at 109. Children’s affect-based decisions about smoking, therefore, result in
error. Id.
234. See infra notes 236–237 and accompanying text.
235. See infra notes 236–237 and accompanying text.
236. Eli Somer & Sharona Szwarcberg, Variables in Delayed Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse,
71 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 332, 338 (2001) (discussing factors that cause delayed disclosure,
including “fears of social rejection and condemnation, mistrust of people, and adoption of familyindoctrinated values of obedience”).
237. Jessie Anderson et al., Prevalence of Childhood Sexual Abuse Experiences in a Community
Sample of Women, 3 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 911, 915 (1993). Twenty-nine
percent of children report fear of being blamed. Id.
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reporting and its effects;238 and embarrassment or shame with reporting.239 The
complicated nature of assessing how to report or what will happen as the result
of a report, coupled with all of these negative feelings, can lead students to
automatically make the decision about whether to report their sexual harassment
based on how they feel about it.240 Their many negative feelings around such
reporting can inhibit or prevent reporting in general, let alone in the
particularized ways required by courts’ evaluations of Title IX’s actual notice
requirement.241
Students’ accounts of why they delay reporting some of their sexual
harassment, along with inconsistent accounts of their feelings about harassment,
demonstrate the affect heuristic. Students often cite fears of people not believing
them and such negative emotions as “nervousness” as reasons for their decisions
to delay or deny reporting.242 They also describe feelings of aversion regarding
the idea of reporting.243 They say they do not report because they strongly want
the harassment to end and be behind them.244 The students’ feelings about their
harassment and reporting it, therefore, serve as the basis for their decisions to
report. Instead of determining whether those feelings are justified in fact, and
then even if they are, whether those facts warrant a non-report, these students
make the decision about reporting simply based on how they feel about it.245
Much like decisions about smoking, where children’s positive feelings are
determinative rather than merely informative of their decision, children’s
238. See Somer & Szwarcberg, supra note 236, at 338.
239. Further, their fears have a foundation in reality. In one study, 25 percent of perpetrators of
sexual assault admitted to using threats to instill fear and prevent the survivors from reporting the assault.
Lee Eric Budin & Charles Felzen Johnson, Sex Abuse Prevention Programs: Offenders’ Attitudes About
Their Efficacy, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 77, 80 (1989). In addition, some school staff hear of sexual
harassment and assault but do not report it because, among other things, they place some of the blame
on the survivors. See Lisa Hinkelman & Michelle Bruno, Identification and Reporting of Child Sexual
Abuse: The Role of Elementary School Professionals, 108 ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 376, 380–81 (2008).
240. See supra notes 230, 233, 236–237 and accompanying text; infra notes 241–243 and
accompanying text.
241. Further, the affect-rich nature of the decision to report makes children susceptible to
overweighing relatively small probabilities, such as the probability that nothing will come of reporting;
this can also deter their reporting. See Rottenstreich & Hsee, supra note 230, at 185–87. That said,
whether the possibility of such negative repercussions is small is debatable. Some students who have
reported their sexual harassment and assault have seen negative consequences, including that the
survivors themselves get punished. Keierleber, supra note 17.
242. In Doe v. Board of Education, for example, student J.D. delayed reporting the sexual assaults
perpetrated by fellow student M.O. and then recanted before reasserting that the assaults happened. 605
F. App’x 159, 163–64 (4th Cir. 2015). J.D. explained that he recanted because he was “nervous,” did
not think his story would be believed, and felt that if he recanted then that “would . . . be the end” of the
investigation and ordeal. Id. (citations omitted).
243. When middle-schooler Jane Doe suffered approximately two years of harassment by other
students, she explained her failure to report all of it as resulting from the feeling of just wanting “to put
the issue behind her.” Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2014).
244. See supra notes 242–243 and accompanying text.
245. That is not to say that such decisions cannot be fully warranted. See Brake & Grossman,
supra note 21, at 900. It is to say, though, that the students describe a purely emotional basis for their
decision without mentioning any assessment of whether those emotions had basis in fact.
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negative feelings about reporting control their decision. They thus substitute the
question of how they feel emotionally about reporting their sexual harassment
for the more involved question of whether they should report it, taking all
relevant information and feelings into account. They therefore exhibit use of the
affect heuristic.
B. They Are Also Children: Child and Adolescent Brain Science
While both children and adults fall prey to these cognitive heuristics, the
immaturities of children’s and adolescents’ developing brains offer still another
set of impediments to their compliance with the decision-making that current
Title IX jurisprudence requires.246 Children’s brains develop over time, and how
children’s brain development affects their decision-making depends on their
age.247 Younger children lack some of the reasoning and future-oriented
decision-making capacity of older children, who have more brain development
and therefore more advanced decision-making capacity than younger children.248
Even the brains of older adolescents, though, are not fully formed.249 Although
older children acquire these skills, their still uneven brain development causes
them to make more emotional instead of reasoned choices, particularly in social
contexts.250 The immaturities in the neurodevelopment of children of all ages
constrain their decision-making capabilities. This adds yet another layer of
difficulty to the process of making complex decisions like the courts’
assessments of Title IX’s actual notice standard demand.251
1. Child and Early Adolescent Brain Development
Complying with Title IX’s actual notice requirements means that children
must make future-oriented decisions that they lack the neurological capacity to
fully assess. Younger children’s incomplete brain development affects their
ability to make the kinds of decisions that courts require under Title IX in at least
two ways. First, younger children have difficulty with future orientation,

246. See infra Parts 0.B.1–2.
247. Steinberg et al., supra note 28, at 35–39; Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 212–13;
Reyna & Farley, supra note 153, at 25 (adolescents understand risks, including those of high-risk
behavior).
248. Research shows that, as children age, their “cognitive maturation entails not only growth in
reasoning capacity, but also the increasing application of intuition to [judgment and decision-making].”
Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 216.
249. In one study, children showed an increase in planning at age fifteen. Steinberg et al., supra
note 28, at 35. With respect to delay discounting, age fourteen or fifteen was a “near-consistent break
point across all delay intervals.” Id. at 36.
250. Adolescents, then, “show developmental gains [in reasoning through] the use of base-rate
information on parallel problems that do not involve social content . . . , but in contexts that activate their
increasingly rich and salient social schemas, heuristic processing appears to gain influence over the
course of adolescent development.” Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 216.
251. Steinberg et al., supra note 28, at 36–37.
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planning, and understanding future consequences.252 Second, they have less
capacity for delay discounting, which is an exercise similar to delayed
gratification.253 For purposes of these future-oriented decision-making
challenges, “younger” children here means children under the age of fourteen or
fifteen.254 After that age, children’s brains have matured to the point of no longer
experiencing these problems with future orientation and planning.255
Younger children encounter multifaceted difficulties with future
orientation.256 Future orientation refers to a variety of perspectives about the
future, including how far one can project into the future, the degree to which one
thinks about the future, and the ability to link present decisions to future
consequences.257 Children under the age of fifteen are significantly less able to
be future-oriented and to plan ahead than older children are.258 In addition,
younger children display substantial challenges with time perspective: the ability
to think about the future and oneself in it.259 Younger children also have trouble
anticipating future consequences.260 Importantly, these difficulties get worse
before they get better. Children between the ages of ten and fifteen demonstrate
less planning capacity than even younger children.261
On top of these challenges, younger children show significant deficits in
delay discounting.262 Delay discounting is similar to delayed gratification in that
it involves delaying a reward.263 The two concepts are distinct, however.264
Delayed gratification requires delaying a specific reward for a set period of
time.265 Delay discounting measures the increments of delay a person will
tolerate before getting a reward that increases in value the longer one waits.266
Younger children have less ability to delay receipt of the ever-increasing reward
than older children.267 They show a greater willingness to accept smaller rewards

252. Id. at 35.
253. Id. at 36–37.
254. See supra note 249.
255. See supra note 249.
256. Steinberg et al., supra note 28, at 39–40.
257. Id. at 28.
258. Id. at 35.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 36–37.
263. Id. at 30. There are two components to developing the capacity to delay discount: impulse
control, and the brain development that regulates abstract, deliberative, future-oriented reasoning. Id.
The brain development mediates the impulse control. See id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 36.
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to obtain the reward sooner than do older children.268 After age sixteen, age has
no significant impact on children’s delay discounting capabilities.269
In deciding whether to report their sexual harassment and abuse, students
must contemplate the future and how they will function in it to decide whom to
tell about their harassment.270 They must also evaluate how events will unfold in
the future as a consequence of their report, which requires both planning ahead
and anticipating future consequences.271 Finally, they have to delay the
tantalizing and immediate, though often false, reward of silence, whereby
students hope that remaining silent will make their problems disappear.272
Younger students struggle with all of these cognitive processes.273 They
explicitly say that they do not report their sexual harassment so they can ignore
the problem in the hope that it will just go away.274 Reporting decisions in the
sexual harassment context thus present future-oriented concerns that younger
children are ill-equipped to consider.
2. Older Adolescent Brain Development
As children age, they show vast improvements in future orientation in
general, and their ability to delay discount in particular. Moreover, they have the
reasoning capacities of adults by the ages of fifteen or sixteen.275 This does not
mean, however, that their brains have fully matured by that point: while some
parts of their brains have reached nearly full or full maturity, other parts have
not.276 This imbalance in brain maturation leads to decision-making problems.277
Relevantly, the limbic system develops earlier in childhood than the
prefrontal cortex develops.278 The limbic system is involved in incentive and
reward processing, while the prefrontal cortex is associated with cognitive
control.279 The limbic system development begins with the onset of puberty.280
268. Id. Children aged fourteen and fifteen showed delay discounting capabilities between those
of the younger and older groups of children. Id. at 37. Notably, this effect remained after controlling for
gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, none of which impacted children’s ability to delay discount.
Id.
269. Id. Significantly, these are the ages when much bullying happens.
270. For example, Alida Gebser wondered whether the teacher who sexually harassed her would
continue to be her teacher in deciding whether to report the harassment. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep.
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 278 (1998). In addition to these sorts of future-oriented calculations, students
also need to consider how the process should and will proceed, which is no small matter given the
difficulty with even ascertaining what those processes are. See supra notes 214, 217 and accompanying
text.
271. See supra notes 214, 217 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 242–243 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part II.B.1.
274. See supra notes 242–243 and accompanying text.
275. Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 219.
276. B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 62, 69–70 (2008).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 63–64.
279. Id. at 69.
280. Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 217.
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Puberty generally occurs before the age of thirteen in girls and before the age of
fourteen in boys.281 Because of changes in dopamine and oxytocin in the brain
associated with limbic system development, the adolescent brain experiences
exaggerated sensitivity to both rewards and social stimuli.282 Studies show that
adolescents respond more strongly to rewards and social stimuli than do younger
children or adults and so seek them out.283
At the same time, adolescents’ prefrontal cortices have not fully
developed.284 The prefrontal cortex is associated with cognitive control,285
including the capacity to “suppress inappropriate thoughts and actions in favor
of goal-directed ones, especially in the presence of compelling incentives.”286
This area of the brain develops throughout adolescence, but not as early as the
limbic system.287
This uneven neurodevelopment offers an explanation for why adolescents
demonstrate increases in risk taking, sensation seeking, and socioemotional
stimuli with seemingly little regard for the repercussions.288 Even though
adolescents are able to reason through and understand the effects of their
decisions, they often disregard this reasoning and engage in behavior that is
dangerous or otherwise against their rational self-interest.289 They do so because,
as one study put it, “in emotionally salient situations, the limbic system will win
over control systems given its maturity relative to the prefrontal control
system.”290 Adolescent decision-making therefore systematically skews toward
impulsively seeking the emotional and social reward, even when doing so could
be harmful.291
Just such self-control over immediate emotional rewards, however, is what
adolescents would require to report sexual harassment and abuse. They need the
self-control offered by a mature prefrontal cortex to overcome their emotional
281. See Cynthia K. Snyder, Puberty: An Overview for Pediatric Nurses, 31 J. PEDIATRIC
NURSING 757, 758 (2016); Risa M. Wolf & Dominique Long, Pubertal Development, 37 PEDIATRICS
REV. 292, 294–95 (2016).
282. Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 217.
283. Casey et al., supra note 276, at 63–64; see also Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 217.
284. Casey et al., supra note 276, at 64; see also Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 217.
285. Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 217.
286. Casey et al., supra note 276, at 64;
287. Casey et al., supra note 276, at 63–64; see also Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 217.
288. See Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 217; Casey et al., supra note 276, at 64. A
socioemotional stimulus is a social stimulus that causes an emotional response. See Albert & Steinberg,
supra note 159, at 217. For example, a crowd of smiling faces at a party may cause a positive emotional
response. Id.
289. “[A]dolescents at higher risk because of their behavior often accurately perceive that they
are at higher risk . . . .” Reyna & Farley, supra note 153, at 26. However, “perceived benefits may drive
adolescents’ reactive behaviors and behavioral intentions, thereby accounting for risk-taking behaviors.”
Id. at 29.
290. Casey et al., supra note 276, at 64.
291. Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 217 (“[T]o the degree that adolescents are primed to
seek out and respond to rewards, and at the same time possess immature self-regulatory skills, the
influence of socioemotional stimuli is likely to loom large for their decision making.”).
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impulses that lead them to not report the harassment.292 Yet adolescents largely
lack the prefrontal cortex development to overcome such emotions.293 Instead,
their emotional impulses will more likely control their reason and inhibit
reporting of sexual harassment, especially in the social context of school.294
C. Title IX’s Paradoxical Standard
Courts’ assessments of actual notice under Title IX create a paradox:
students must do what they largely cannot in order to access Title IX’s
protections.295 Children and adolescents, just like adults, are susceptible to using
the unavailability heuristic and the affect heuristic as decision-making
shortcuts.296 Both heuristics inhibit their ability to make the kinds of decisions
required by Title IX jurisprudence.297 For children and adolescents deciding
whether to report their sexual harassment, the immaturities of their brain
development create another set of obstacles.298 Therefore, while cognitive
heuristics make the kinds of sexual harassment reporting required for a
successful Title IX claim challenging for anyone, the immaturities of children’s
brain development make those decisions particularly unrealizable.299 These
multi-layered challenges render largely out of reach for children the decision to
report in the particularized ways required by courts’ assessments of actual notice.
Instead of considering these factors, though, courts either assume children
have the capacity to make the decisions they require under Title IX or implicitly
deem lack of such capacity irrelevant.300 They do so by confining their actual
notice inquiries to unilateral assessments of whether schools have received
sufficient notice of student sexual harassment.301 Courts, therefore, effectively

292. These emotions include shame, embarrassment, and fear of being blamed or of reprisal by
the perpetrator. See supra notes 236–237 and accompanying text; e.g., Doe v. Flaherty, 623 F.3d. 577,
582 (8th Cir. 2010) (Coach Chad Smith, who engaged in a sexual relationship with high school student
Jane Doe, threatened students “to prevent them from talking to their parents about him”).
293. See supra notes 284–285.
294. See supra notes 242–243 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Parts 0.A–B.
296. See supra Part 0.A.
297. See supra Part 0.A.
298. See supra Part 0.B.
299. See supra Part 0.B.
300. “Every policy question involves assumptions about human nature, in particular about the
choices that people may make and the consequences of their choices for themselves and for society.”
KAHNEMAN, supra note 23, at 141. Title IX is no different. Courts therefore assume a choice that
children can, should, and will, if they want legal protection, make.
301. E.g., Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding no actual notice because
“[s]chool administrators learned of some of the more minor incidents between Doe and other students
contemporaneously, but it is undisputed that they did not witness and were not told about the violent
incidents until the evening of the last day of her seventh grade year at the earliest.”); Doe v. Flaherty,
623 F.3d 577, 585 (8th Cir. 2010) (“We agree with the district court that [Coach] Smith’s text messages
to female students did not provide [Principal] Wilcher with actual notice of sexual abuse. The
inappropriate comments in those messages, without more, did not alert Wilcher that Smith was involved
in a sexual relationship with a student.”).
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require children to make the decision to report their sexual harassment and abuse
without consideration of whether such decisions even lie within the realm of
possibilities for real-world children.302
Because courts’ development of actual notice under Title IX sets a nearly
impossible standard for students to meet, Title IX offers little protection to
students in the K-through-twelve public school setting. Public schools have no
obligation under Title IX to act without such notice.303 Courts’ evaluations of
Title IX, therefore, favor ensuring that schools have contemporaneous, timely,
and full notice of sexual harassment over considering students’ capabilities to
provide that notice or students’ need for protection from sexual harassment and
abuse. Despite Title IX’s protective purpose, therefore, courts’ evaluations of
actual notice eviscerate much of its power to protect students from sexual
harassment and abuse in school.304
III.
OVERCOMING THE PARADOX: ACCOUNTING FOR STUDENTS’ INEVITABLE
DECISION-MAKING ERRORS AND IMMATURE BRAIN DEVELOPMENT
For Title IX to fulfill its purpose of protecting students from sexual
harassment in public schools, it must consider how cognitive heuristics and brain
development affect the decision-making of children and adolescents. At the time
Title IX jurisprudence developed, scholars had only begun to analyze how
empirical research on cognitive heuristics should be incorporated into doctrine
and policy.305 Child and adolescent brain research was also not as advanced.306
Now, both behavioral psychology and child and adolescent neuroscientific
research are far more developed and understood, and such knowledge has been
applied to many varied areas of law.307 Title IX jurisprudence, therefore, can no
longer justify failing to consider these understandings.
Title IX’s actual notice standard must be reconceptualized to account for
these new understandings. This Section proposes an appropriately revised notice
standard and a framework for evaluating it.308 In addition, legislative and policy
changes should compel schools to facilitate and encourage the reporting of
sexual harassment and abuse. Because cognitive heuristics affect the decisionmaking of both adults and children, the changes proposed here could apply to
any Title IX claim.309 But because immature neurodevelopment creates an added

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

See supra Parts 0.A–C.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See supra Part 0.D.
See supra notes 6, 27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 6, 29 and accompanying text; supra Part 0.B.
See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
See infra Part 0.A.
See supra Part 0.A.
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layer of difficulty for children, these proposed changes are particularly urgent
for the K-through-twelve public school population.310
Significantly, these proposed changes are not radical. They do not call for
a new standard or a complete overhaul of existing legal frameworks.311 Instead,
they work within those frameworks. Still, these changes will broaden the scope
of actual notice and more readily compel schools to respond to children’s sexual
harassment.312 These changes will address students’ incapacity to meet Title IX’s
particularized reporting requirements and stop shifting the heavy burden to
report onto students. These proposals would resurrect Title IX from its nearly
impotent state and restore its power to protect children.
The Supreme Court’s rationale in its most recent Title IX decision, Jackson
v. Birmingham Board of Education, mirrors and supports the change in the
thinking this Article calls for.313 In Jackson, the Court found that Title IX
protections extend to claims of retaliation for reporting alleged violations,
reasoning that Title IX’s protective purpose would be “difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve if persons who complain about sex discrimination did not
have effective protection against retaliation.”314 The Court went on to explain,
“[r]eporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement
and . . . if retaliation were not prohibited, Title IX’s enforcement scheme would
unravel.”315 Title IX’s actual notice regime, though, has already largely
unraveled the law’s enforcement scheme in the K-through-twelve public school
context.316 Title IX relies heavily on students to report their own harassment even
though making compliant reports may be nearly impossible. Therefore, Title IX
doctrine and policy must change to avoid the problems associated with the
existing reporting system.
These proposals are of course open to critique. I grapple with those critiques
that apply to specific proposals in the following subparts. The final subpart will
address three critiques that apply generally to all of these proposals.

310. See supra Part 0.B.
311. See infra Parts 0.A–C.
312. Under these proposals, students would more easily be able to satisfy actual notice; thus,
courts would be more likely to find schools liable under Title IX for failure to respond. To avoid such
liability, schools therefore would have to act to address or prevent the sexual harassment in more
circumstances than they do now. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 796 (arguing that liability
offers a government agency the “incentive to monitor, supervise, and control the acts of their
employees”); see also Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect
of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 854–55 (2001) (contending that liability or its
potential has a fault-fixing effect that can promote institutional change).
313. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
314. Id. at 171, 180 (citation omitted).
315. Id. at 180.
316. See supra Part 0.C.
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A. Reconceptualizing the Actual Notice Standard
The actual notice standard must be reconceptualized to incorporate modern
understandings of cognitive heuristics and child and adolescent brain
development into Title IX doctrine. This standard has been rightly criticized as,
among other things, creating perverse incentives and being rooted in
misconceptions.317 While abandoning the actual notice standard altogether might
correct these flaws, another avenue would reconceptualize the standard instead.
More specifically, reconceptualizing actual notice would mean using empirical
research in behavioral psychology and child and adolescent neuroscience to
inform what it means to (1) report contemporaneously, (2) to appropriate
persons, and (3) with particular information.
1. Reconceptualizing Notions of “Contemporaneous” Reporting
Currently, courts base their assessments of contemporaneous notice on the
proximity in time of the report to the sexual harassment.318 These interpretations
fail to consider the cognitive heuristics and the immaturities of children’s brains
that inhibit what courts presently define as contemporaneous reporting.319
Incorporating the understandings of this empirical research into the actual notice
standard would require accommodating for students’ almost-inevitable delays in
reporting. More specifically, this change would warrant interpreting
“contemporaneous” reporting to mean reporting that happens whenever the child
is capable of making the report, irrespective of when the harassment occurred.
That is, the shift would change the metric for measuring contemporaneous
reporting. The proposed change would reconceptualize Title IX to measure

317. MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 2091 (“From the perspective of educational equality, the
deliberate indifference standard creates perverse incentives. It encourages schools not to know and to
avoid learning about sexual atrocities so as to avoid notice of them, so no response, however indifferent,
can be deliberate.”); Suski, supra note 6, at 725 (arguing that Title IX’s liability limits are based, among
other things, on courts’ misconceptions about how Title IX liability would unduly burden schools). I
neither take issue with MacKinnon’s proposals for Title IX reform nor abandon my previous hybrid
actual-constructive notice proposal. Although these proposals take a different tack, they would achieve
similar or the same ends as my previous proposals. The reconceptualization of the actual notice standard
advanced here serves as an alternate, even complementary, route to achieving the goal of increasing
protection for students by strengthening Title IX standards. In distinct though not unrelated critiques,
others have called for revisions to the standard for evaluating claims of sexual harassment in
employment under Title VII. For example, Angela Onwuachi-Willig writes, “To ensure that judicial
analyses of sexual harassment claims leave room for the experiences of women of color, courts should
adopt a standard based on a reasonable person with the complainant’s intersectional and
multidimensional identity, rather than the ostensibly objective reasonable person standard, or even the
presumably more inclusive reasonable women’s standard.” Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 119.
Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman have persuasively argued that women delay reporting sexual
harassment and discrimination in the workplace because of difficulties both perceiving the
discrimination and challenging it. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 21, at 887.
318. See supra Part 0.A.
319. See supra Part 0.C.
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contemporaneity by when the child becomes ready to report rather than when the
harassment or abuse occurred.
As a practical matter, this proposed change would mean holding schools
responsible for responding to student reports of sexual harassment and abuse
even if those reports occurred months or years later. In such cases, the notice
should only be deemed untimely if a school could show that the report occurred
beyond the time a student had the capacity to report, and the student could not
provide a good reason for the delay. For example, a school could show that a
student reported the harassment to parents and friends but then waited a year to
inform the school. The evidence of the student’s reports to parents and friends
would indicate that the student had the capacity to report the harassment but
neglected to tell the school. If the student could not demonstrate a good reason
for the year-long delay between the report to others and the report to the school,
the student’s report to the school would not be contemporaneous even under this
revised actual notice metric.320
Barring such evidence, if a student reported sexual harassment six months
after it occurred, then the public school must reasonably respond to the sexual
harassment at that time. The school would not incur liability for its past failure
to act at the time of the harassment if no report had been made yet. The
exemption would satisfy one of the strongest concerns underlying courts’
establishment of the stringent actual notice standard: the unfairness in requiring
schools to address sexual harassment when they do not know about it.321 The
time the child reports will dictate when and how the school must respond. If a
child reported several months or more after an assault, for example, a school
could not possibly be expected to prevent the harassment that already occurred.
However, if the harassment is likely to reoccur, then the school would need to
take reasonable steps to prevent that reoccurrence. In addition, the school could
also determine whether to punish the perpetrator at that time. Finally, public
schools could offer students who have suffered sexual harassment and assault
services to address the harms associated with the abuse.322 The point of
reconceptualizing contemporaneous notice, though, is not to prescribe precise

320. For instance, evidence that the school somehow impeded reporting of the harassment could
theoretically demonstrate a good reason for the delay. While the likelihood of students successfully
showing such good reason might be small, the evaluation framework should nevertheless accommodate
for its potential existence.
321. See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999) (“A
recipient cannot be directly liable for its indifference where it lacks the authority to take remedial
action.”).
322. These might include counseling or a school transfer for either the survivor or the perpetrator,
all at the survivor’s option. Schools would have to proceed with caution here to avoid imposing services
on the survivor that might be unwanted, unhelpful, or counterproductive. See, e.g., Sandra E. Gibson,
Legal Caring: Preventing Retraumatization of Abused Children Through the Caring Nursing Interview
Using Roach’s Six Cs, 12 INT’L J. FOR HUM. CARING 32, 33–36 (2008) (noting that because children
experience re-traumatization of past sexual assaults when reminded or asked about them, it can be
helpful to use open-ended questions that do not lead but instead allow the child to lead).
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actions that schools must take in response to reported sexual harassment.323
Rather, the reconceptualization would require schools to act in some reasonable
way upon receiving such reports, even ones made well after the time of the
harassment itself.
Under this conceptualization of contemporaneity, outcomes in some Title
IX cases would have been different. For example, in Doe v. Board of Education
of Prince George’s County, J.D.’s report of M.O.’s sexual assaults would meet
this reconceptualized actual notice standard even though J.D. made the report
more than a year after the assaults began.324 J.D. reported those assaults
contemporaneously with the time he had the capability to do so.325 J.D. said that
he did not report earlier because he hoped that by ignoring the assaults, they
would stop.326 That is, he demonstrated use of the affect heuristic and the
immaturities of his brain development in his decision-making.327 It took more
than a year for him to overcome that thinking.328 Because he made the report
when he had the ability to do so, J.D. would satisfy the reconceptualized
definition of contemporaneous notice.329 J.D.’s report would thus require that his
school respond to his report at the time of the report, for example, by potentially
providing J.D. services to address the trauma resulting from his assaults. If the
school did not respond to J.D.’s report, the school would be liable for the failure
to act but not the failure to act when the assaults happened. Holding schools
responsible for addressing sexual harassment and abuse whenever they learn of
the harassment would help overcome the problems associated with the cognitive
heuristics and child brain development that inhibit reporting of sexual
harassment. Further, it would lend greater protection to developmentally
challenged or otherwise marginalized students, who are less capable of
expressing themselves.330
Notwithstanding how these changes would help overcome the cognitive
and developmental problems that inhibit reporting of sexual harassment, critics
could argue that holding schools responsible for addressing sexual harassment
and abuse whenever they learn of the harassment would expose public schools
to open-ended liability.331 Public schools could face liability for sexual

323. That is the framework of the much-criticized deliberate indifference standard. See supra
notes 6, 49 and accompanying text.
324. See Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159, 163–64 (4th Cir. 2015).
325. Id. at 163.
326. Id. at 164.
327. See supra Parts 0.A–B.
328. Doe, 605 F. App’x at 163–64.
329. See id.
330. See, e.g., Rost v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 2008);
supra note 119 and accompanying text.
331. Statutes of limitations, after all, exist in part to serve justice through predictability and the
preservation of evidence. See Jessica E. Mindlin, Child Sexual Abuse and Criminal Statutes of
Limitation: A Model for Reform, 65 WASH. L. REV. 189, 201–02 (1990).
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harassment that happened years prior to a student’s report.332 This concern,
however, misses the point. Public schools would not be responsible for the sexual
harassment that happened long ago if they had taken reasonable steps to address
it when they did find out about it. Under this standard, a reasonable response to
a report that occurs years after the abuse could potentially be to do little or
nothing. Case-by-case analysis would be required to determine what would be
reasonable, allowing the Title IX machinery to better address past sexual
harassment and protect students from future harassment. Further, such critiques
have regularly surfaced against extending or eliminating statutes of limitations
on the prosecutions of sex offenders.333 Yet recognizing the difficulties survivors
have faced in coming forward, states are increasingly eliminating statutes of
limitations for such criminal prosecutions.334 The same policy principles support
holding schools responsible for doing something to address sexual harassment
and abuse when they do learn about the harassment.
2. Reconceptualizing “Appropriate Persons”
Similarly, empirical research on cognitive heuristics and child and
adolescent brain science should inform court assessments of actual notice by
reconceptualizing the meaning of “appropriate persons” to whom students report
the sexual harassment.335 This reconceptualization would involve abandoning
interpretations of “appropriate persons” as particular categories of school
officials, like administrators and those with the authority to bind the school.336 It
would mean redefining “appropriate persons” to include any adult who works
for a school.337
332. Id.
333. See, e.g., Jill Filipovic, Opinion, No More Statutes of Limitations for Rapes, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opinion/no-more-statutes-of-limitations-forrape.html [https://perma.cc/X7WE-69NT] (acknowledging that the goals of statutes of limitations are
laudable but, for practical purposes, do not work—or are outweighed by countervailing benefits from
eliminating statutes of limitations—in cases of sexual assault and rape).
334. At least twenty states have eliminated some statutes of limitations for some child sex abuse
crimes. MARCI A. HAMILTON, CHILD USA, CHILD SEX ABUSE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS REFORM IN
THE WAKE OF THE BOSTON ARCHDIOCESE CLERGY SEX ABUSE SCANDAL 25–28 (2002),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a120b962aeba581dd692cd4/t/5ad929f3758d466f749214e8/
1524181553971/2018_CHILDUSA_SOLReport4.19.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUS7-C22A]. Fifteen
states have no limitations on when a prosecution of a felony sexual assault of a minor can occur. Ruth
Padawer, Should Statutes of Limitations for Rape Be Abolished?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/magazine/should-statutes-of-limitations-for-rape-beabolished.html [https://perma.cc/QV73-R3TY].
335. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
336. See supra Part 0.B.
337. Arguably, this conceptualization conflicts with the Gebser Court’s Spending Clause
rationale, which was central to its requirement that persons with authority to bind the school know about
the sexual harassment. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. However, those persons have full
authority to—and should under this revised conceptualization—require their staff to report any and all
reports that can conceivably be interpreted as a report of sexual harassment to an administrator. This
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Conceiving of “appropriate persons” in this way overcomes the problems
with availability and affect heuristics as well as children’s immature brain
development.338 The reconceptualization allows students to report to the adult at
school with whom they feel most comfortable, thus negating the affect heuristic.
Interpreting “appropriate persons” to mean any adult employed by the school
also simplifies the reporting assessment for students.339 The new interpretation
thus helps to avoid the availability heuristic, which operates in the face of
complicated decisions.340
Such a reconceptualization arguably also still fits within the parameters set
forth by the Supreme Court’s own definition of “appropriate person.”341 In
Gebser, the Court said an appropriate person is someone “with authority to take
corrective action to end the discrimination.”342 The Court established this
requirement partially because of Title IX’s contractual nature, a statute enacted
under Congress’s Spending Clause authority.343 Concerned about imposing
liability for a problem a school did not know about and could not address, the
Court defined “appropriate persons” as those with authority to take action to
correct the problem.344 Yet any adult employee of the school has the authority to
take corrective action regarding sexual harassment because any adult can notify
the school or higher-level administrator. Further, even were that an insufficient
answer to the Court’s concerns, under this reconceptualized definition of
“appropriate persons,” administrators can also mandate that lower level staff
inform them of any reports of sexual harassment so that they can act to remedy
it.
For students like Jherald, the boy assaulted by the bus driver in Santiago v.
Puerto Rico, this revised understanding of “appropriate persons” would mean
that the report of the assault to the school teachers and social workers at his
school would satisfy the actual notice standard.345 Even those staff members
without supervisory authority over the bus driver could report the assault to
proper authorities.346 Thus, they could take action to ensure the assault was
addressed and prevent further assaults.

would address the Court’s concerns about notice while still accounting for the vagaries of student
reporting.
338. See supra Parts 0.A–B.
339. See supra Part 0.D.
340. See supra Part 0.D.
341. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 286–88. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
344. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
345. See 655 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 2011).
346. See id.
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3. Reconceptualizing What Information Must Be Reported
Finally, the impact of cognitive heuristics and child and adolescent brain
development justifies the revisiting of what information about sexual harassment
must be reported. In the present evaluation, courts focus on whether public
schools receive sufficiently specific information to hold them liable under Title
IX.347 They fail to consider that the affect heuristic and the students’ immature
brain development inhibit such detailed reporting, as can other factors such as a
child’s disability status.348
Considering these inhibitors allows for reconceptualizing actual notice in
this way: students will have provided sufficient information to satisfy the Title
IX standard when they intended to make the report and provided as much
information as possible given the communication skills available to them.
Assessing actual notice in this way makes the assessment more individualized,
child-centric, and context-specific. This revision requires an inquiry into what
each child can do given the impact of cognitive heuristics and immature brain
development as well as factors such as disability.349 Put another way, this
revision calls for courts to evaluate why a student may have made a less-thanperfectly-specific report. To do so, courts would need to consider evidence about
reporting protocols at the school and how easy (or not) they were to navigate. In
addition, courts might need to hear from experts about psychological or other
obstacles that might have affected the child’s reporting. If such evidence
established that a child’s report was not specific because of reasons beyond the
control of the child, then the child’s report should be deemed to have provided
sufficient information to establish actual notice.
To be sure, such an inquiry would be intensely fact-specific, but it would
not be beyond the capacity of courts. Courts already make exceedingly factspecific evaluations, including in the K-through-twelve school context.350 All
that said, if a child could not establish a reason for making either a less-thanprecise report of sexual harassment or not making a report at all, despite clear,

347. See supra Part 0.C.
348. See supra Parts I.C., 0.A.2.–B; Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511
F.3d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 2008); supra notes 119, 122 and accompanying text.
349. Cases reflect that children who are abused may make incomplete reports of their abuse or
use vague words. See supra Part 0.C. Lacking the precise language of sexual assault, they may say, for
example, that other children are “bothering” them. See, e.g., Rost, 511 F.3d at 1117. Any such
expressions could compel schools to take some action: for example, monitoring the situation and
investigating to learn more so that they can respond appropriately. School action might also involve
intervening to remove the perpetrator from any interaction with the survivor. Responses could vary
depending on the report. Again, the point is to compel some response by schools. See supra notes 6, 49
and accompanying text.
350. For example, when evaluating claims brought by children under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, courts must determine the effects of the individual child’s disability on their
education and whether the individualized education plan offered by the school to address those effects
is appropriate. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320, .516 (2019).
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easy reporting protocols developed with psychological or other obstacles in
mind, then the child could not satisfy the actual notice standard.
Under this reconceptualization of what constitutes sufficient information to
satisfy actual notice, children like middle-school student K.C. in Rost v.
Steamboat Springs RE-2 School, who reported her sexual assaults by saying boys
were “bothering” her, would be able to meet the actual notice standard.351
Because K.C., who had an intellectual disability, intended to report her sexual
harassment and used the only language she knew and had available to make the
report, she would meet the actual notice standard, and the school therefore would
be required to act on her report.352 That report should trigger at least a thorough
inquiry into how the boys were bothering K.C.
Critics may argue that this interpretation of sufficient notice effectively
remakes actual notice into a constructive notice standard.353 While, to be sure,
this interpretation is a less stringent interpretation of the actual notice standard
than courts currently apply, it still differs from constructive notice in that it relies
on the school being provided some information before incurring any obligation
to act.354 Thus, unlike constructive notice, it does not impute notice to the schools
without some express, if imprecise, information being provided to the school.355
So, if a child reports a problem involving sexual harassment even in a vague
way, the school would have an obligation to look into whether and how much
sexual harassment is happening. The school would not, however, be required to
do so before it learns of such information. This standard would not require
schools to be on a constant search for sexual harassment without any
provocation. However, it would also not completely insulate a school burying its
head in the sand because a report of sexual harassment is not sufficiently precise.

351. 511 F.3d at 1119–20.
352. See id.; see also supra notes 6, 49 and accompanying text.
353. The Supreme Court rejected the constructive notice standard for varying reasons in Gebser
and Davis. In Gebser, the Court concluded that the actual notice standard would better meet the
protective purpose of Title IX. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1998). In
Davis, the Court expressed concern that holding schools liable under such a standard would not allow
them sufficient control over students and would create a veritable flood of Title IX liability. Davis ex
rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 647-48 (1999).
354. See supra notes 40, 46 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Title VII has such a constructive notice standard,
allowing for employer liability for sexual harassment without the employer having received any express
information of sexual harassment at all. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2019). Under this standard, employers
are liable “for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took
immediate and appropriate corrective action.” Id.; see also, e.g., Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881,
906 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[W]e find that there was sufficient evidence in the record from which it could be
inferred that the atmosphere described by the plaintiff was so blatant as to put the defendants on
constructive notice that sex discrimination permeated the Program. The most obvious example of the
offensive atmosphere was the constant attack by male residents on the capabilities of the plaintiff and
other female residents.”).
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B. Revising the Title IX Evaluation Framework
This proposed broadening of the actual notice standard should be coupled
with a revision to the framework for evaluating Title IX claims. More
specifically, the evaluation of actual notice should include an evidentiary burdenshifting element. This burden-shifting component would operate such that once
students offer some evidence that a school had notice—even legally insufficient
notice—of their sexual harassment, then the burden of proof would shift to the
public schools to establish that they did something to encourage and to facilitate
reporting of sexual harassment.356 Failure to meet this burden would satisfy the
actual notice element of the Title IX claim.
This change to the evaluation framework of Title IX claims would take
some of the responsibility off students for ensuring that schools have the
information they need to take action under Title IX. Currently, this burden falls
exclusively on the students bringing claims under Title IX.357 By instead sharing
that responsibility with the schools, courts’ evaluations of students’ Title IX
claims would no longer privilege schools’ passive, one-sided receipt of
information over students’ capacity to provide it.358
In addition, this revised analysis still offers schools substantial flexibility.
It requires no specific steps to promote student reporting. Public schools,
therefore, could develop detailed procedures for reporting sexual harassment and
abuse and broadly publicize them to students and staff in accessible language.
Alternatively, schools could require that administrators regularly inquire into
whether any school employee has received a conceivable report of sexual
harassment. Any such steps would satisfy the burden in this revised framework
because they do something to encourage student reporting of sexual harassment.
C. Title IX Policy Reforms
Finally, to accommodate the challenges students face in reporting sexual
harassment generally and in the particularized ways that courts require, Title IX
should be revised to require affirmative steps by schools that address and account
for the effects of cognitive heuristics and child and adolescents’ immature
neurodevelopment. As the law now stands, although Title IX prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex, neither it nor the courts’ assessments of it
requires anything affirmative of schools.359 The burden to report sexual
harassment falls almost exclusively on the student who suffered the

356. See Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 51 (1961) (“[B]urden of
proof . . . refer[s] to two separate and quite different concepts[:] . . . (1) the risk of non-persuasion, or the
burden of persuasion or simply persuasion burden; (2) the duty of producing evidence, the burden of
going forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden . . . .”).
357. See supra Part 0.C.
358. See supra Part 0.C.
359. See supra Parts 0.A–C.

2020]

THE TITLE IX PARADOX

1197

harassment.360 Instead, Title IX should require that public schools implement
policies and procedures to help children overcome the inhibitions resulting from
cognitive heuristics and children’s immature brain development. It should
mandate that schools develop policies and programs to encourage and facilitate
reporting of sexual harassment and abuse.
First, Title IX should require schools to train all students at least annually
on how to report sexual harassment, on what information to provide when
making such a report, and to whom reports should be made.361 This training
would directly combat the problems presented by the availability heuristic and
the interrelated lack of information on how to report. Further, this training should
include reassurances to students that the school will support, believe, and address
their reports of sexual harassment in concrete ways. This training would
therefore also diminish the problems of the availability heuristic. Such training
would work to address the problems associated with students’ immature brain
development by informing students, many of whom naturally have difficulty
planning ahead, how a report will play out in the future.362 Further, it would help
to reassure emotionally wrought older children whose fears and emotions can
overwhelm their decision-making.363
Second, Title IX should compel schools to train all staff on sexual
harassment and abuse. This training would need to include what constitutes
sexual harassment and abuse, the many varied and sometimes imprecise ways
students report or display symptoms of it, and what to do about it. That way, staff
who receive imprecise reports of sexual harassment and abuse will be better able
to recognize such reports and respond appropriately, including by informing
higher-level school administrators with the authority to address the problem.
This training would also, therefore, dovetail with and reinforce the revised
conceptualization of “appropriate persons” under the actual notice standard.
One potential concern with this proposal is that it relies heavily on training,
which may burden schools. However, schools regularly train broadly on issues
360. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
361. In a recent report on the effectiveness of workplace sexual harassment training, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission concluded that such training could increase awareness of what
constitutes inappropriate or unwelcome behavior and increase the frequency of complaints. CHAI R.
FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COCHAIRS OF THE EEOC SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 46–
49
(2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P5TC-DABA] (“[I]t appears that training can increase the ability of attendees to
understand the type of conduct that is considered harassment and hence unacceptable in the
workplace.”). In addition, public schools’ purpose for being, of course, is to train and educate students,
so their existence supports the idea that training is effective and beneficial. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (stating schools are “educating the young for
citizenship”).
362. See supra Part 0.B.1.
363. See supra Part 0.B.2. Further, such training should be publicly available online and through
any online school information-sharing system, such as Infinite Campus. INFINITE CAMPUS,
https://www.infinitecampus.com [https://perma.cc/2PZN-9EEE].
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such as bullying.364 Further, educating large populations is the essence of what
schools do.365 These policy prescriptions, therefore, align precisely with schools’
very purpose and work.
A different, more serious concern about these policy proposals is that they
could create a vehicle for courts to fashion an affirmative defense for schools to
students’ Title IX claims.366 This concern derives from the evolution of Title VII
jurisprudence, which prohibits sex discrimination in employment.367 There, an
employer has an affirmative defense to a Title VII action if the employer can
show that it implemented reasonable procedures to prevent and correct sexual
harassment, and that the employee unreasonably failed to avail herself of
them.368 Some courts have interpreted this defense to mean that once an
employer shows that such procedures exist, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff-employee to show why they did not take advantage of those
procedures.369 The purpose of these proposed procedures here, however, is to do
the opposite: to shift some of the burden to the schools. Thus, any such changes
to Title IX must be accompanied by proscriptions against interpretations
allowing for such burden-shifting back to students. More specifically, these
proposed changes to Title IX should expressly state that they do not create any
affirmative defense for schools or burden-shifting back to students.370
D. Three General Critiques
Because these proposals find their roots in empirical research on behavioral
psychology and child and adolescent neuroscience, future research may affect

364. See, e.g., Prevention at School, STOPBULLYING.GOV, https://www.stopbullying.gov/
prevention/at-school/index.html [https://perma.cc/6MWE-SSZZ] (showing the federal government’s
guidance on training student populations and school staff on bullying).
365. See supra note 361 and accompanying text. Even institutions whose purpose is not teaching
regularly train large staff populations on legal requirements. For example, hospitals train all staff and
volunteers on the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). E.g., 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.530(b)(1) (2019) (“A covered entity must train all members of its workforce on the policies and
procedures with respect to protected health information required by this subpart and subpart D of this
part, as necessary and appropriate for the members of the workforce to carry out their functions within
the covered entity.”). This proposal, therefore, is neither unique in the law nor does it require schools to
step outside of their skill sets.
366. Justice Ginsburg proposed such an affirmative defense in her dissent in Gebser. Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 307 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I would recognize
as an affirmative defense to a Title IX charge of sexual harassment, an effective policy for reporting and
redressing such misconduct.”). Given how the affirmative defense has been interpreted under Title VII
since then, though, one has to wonder whether Justice Ginsburg would make such a proposal now. See
infra note 369 and accompanying text.
367. Hébert, supra note 21, at 715–16.
368. Id. at 714.
369. Id. at 716 (“[A]fter the employer has shown that the employee completely failed to use a
complaint process, the plaintiff has been required to come forward with reasons for the failure to use
that process, and the courts have considered the adequacy of those reasons in determining whether the
employer’s burden of persuasion has been carried.”).
370. See id.
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their findings. One critique of these proposals, therefore, is that they leave the
doctrine susceptible to changing research. However, the cognitive heuristics
research is decades old.371 Since cognitive heuristics were first identified and
their existence proven in the early 1970s, studies have repeatedly replicated the
findings.372 So, while the understanding of cognitive heuristics have been and,
in all likelihood, will continue to be refined, the basic concepts underlying the
proposals have firm roots. The neuroscientific research, however, is not so old
and well-established.373 That said, the fundamental ideas about children’s
difficulties with decision-making are clear.374 The neuroscience works to explain
the cause of those problems, not uncover the problems themselves.375 Finally,
even were all that not the case, the alternative to trying to refine the law to
accommodate for new understandings would be to leave the law intact despite
new scientific developments. The law should not remain ignorant for the sake of
consistency.
A second critique of these proposals is that they may exacerbate the
problems associated with the overuse of harsh school discipline and the now
infamously problematic school-to-prison pipeline, which disproportionately
impacts students of color and students with disabilities.376 In other words, if

371. Kahneman and Tversky first published their research on the availability heuristic in 1971.
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23, at 208; see also supra note 190 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
373. It dates back only twenty years or fewer. See, e.g., Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159
(2011); Steinberg et al., supra note 28 (2009); Reyna & Farley, supra note 153 (2006).
374. E.g., Albert & Steinberg, supra note 159, at 217 (“[R]ecent research suggests that two broad
patterns in adolescent neurobehavioral development may combine to confer unique adolescent
susceptibility to socioemotional influences on [judgment and decision-making].”); Casey et al., supra
note 276, at 63, 73 (explaining that “[a] number of cognitive and neurobiological hypotheses have been
postulated for why adolescents engage in suboptimal choice behavior” and finding that “increased risktaking behavior in adolescence is associated with different developmental trajectories of subcortical
pleasure and cortical control regions”).
375. See id.
376. A recent study found that in the 2011 to 2012 academic year, at the high school level, 23.8
percent of Black students and 10.8 percent of Latinx students were suspended from school, as compared
to only 6.7 percent of white students. Daniel Losen et al., CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES, Are We
Closing
the
School
Discipline
Gap?
6,
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2t36g571
[https://perma.cc/JHX7-5T3K]. The same study found that Black males with disabilities had the highest
rate of suspensions at 33.8 percent and Latinx males with disabilities the second-highest rate at 23.2
percent. Id. Although white males with disabilities were also suspended at a high rate—16.2 percent—
this rate was low compared to their Black and Latinx counterparts. See id. The authors of the study noted
that these findings “should . . . raise alarms because of the negative impact high suspension rates have
on graduation rates, the learning environment, and rates of juvenile crime and delinquency in the larger
community. We commonly call this impact the school-to-prison pipeline.” Id. at 2; see also, e.g., JUDITH
A. BROWNE, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, DERAILED!: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 12
(2003),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED480206.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N54X-WZ9V]
(“Criminalizing trivial offences pushes children out of the school system and into the juvenile justice
system. Even in cases where punishments are mild, students are less likely to graduate and more likely
to end up back in the court system than their peers.”); Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2016) (describing the problems with the school-to-prison pipeline and arguing
for a “broad legal theory for holistically reforming school discipline”).

1200

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:1147

schools are required to do more in response to student sexual harassment, then
schools will comply with that mandate by suspending and expelling student
perpetrators of sexual harassment. That, in turn, could easily exacerbate the
school-to-prison pipeline and its attendant disproportionate effects.377 That
critique assumes, though, that the only response to uncovering peer sexual
harassment is to suspend and expel those perpetrators.378 Nothing proposed here
mandates any particular form of discipline. To the contrary, children who subject
other children to sexual harassment and abuse often have been victimized
themselves.379 Those children who themselves perpetrate sexual harassment and
abuse likely need treatment, not punishment.380
The third critique is that because these recommendations would likely
expand liability for public schools, they would propagate a sort of moral
hazard.381 That is, if a student brought a successful Title IX action for damages
under this reconceptualization of actual notice and reformulated Title IX
evaluation framework, the effect could be to allocate limited public school
resources to one student while simultaneously reducing the resources available
to students more generally. Although I have addressed this critique in my
previous scholarship, the point is serious enough that those responses bear
repeating.382 Although public schools without question work under financial
constraints, the answer to such constraints should not be to leave children who
have suffered sexual harassment and abuse in school with hollow, ineffective
legal recourse and protection.383 In addition, even under the current Title IX
regime, students have the potential to recover damages.384 The only real way,
then, to avoid the concern about holding public schools liable for money
damages would be to provide for blanket immunity in all claims. Since that
would mean schools would have no liability even in egregious cases of sex
discrimination, race discrimination, or intentional harms to students, that option
377. See Losen et al., supra note 376.
378. In Doe, the Fourth Circuit expressed this very concern, saying “nothing short of expulsion
of every student accused of misconduct involving sexual overtones would protect school systems from
[Title IX] liability or damages.” Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159, 165 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted).
379. Empirical research has shown that victims of sex abuse, particularly male victims,
disproportionately become perpetrators. M. Glasser et al., Cycle of Child Sexual Abuse: Links Between
Being a Victim and Becoming a Perpetrator, 179 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 482, 488 (2001) (“Of all reported
victims 59% were also perpetrators . . . .”).
380. See id.
381. Moral hazard is defined as “the perverse consequences of well-intentioned efforts to share
the burdens of life.” Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996).
Generalizing the concept from its origins in the potential hazards of insurance coverage, Baker further
explains a moral hazard as existing “any time that one party’s actions have consequences for the risk of
loss borne by another.” Id. at 272.
382. Suski, supra note 6, at 775–77.
383. See id. at 776 (“[T]he answer to schools’ financial concerns should not come at the expense
of students’ safety and wellbeing but instead should be addressed through the states’ legislative and
budgetary processes.”).
384. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290–91(1998).
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is untenable.385 Finally, because schools carry liability insurance, schools have
protection from the potential financial consequences of liability.386
CONCLUSION
In the current evaluation, courts effectively require students who suffer
sexual harassment and abuse in school to do what they largely cannot in order to
access Title IX’s protections. Through their development of the actual notice
standard, courts essentially demand that students not only report their sexual
harassment but also do so at particular times, to particular school officials, and
with particular information. Yet empirical research on cognitive heuristics and
child and adolescent neuroscience demonstrate that children will naturally face
significant difficulties in making the decision to report their sexual harassment
at all, let alone in the precise ways the courts require. Absent such reporting,
however, schools have no obligation under Title IX to address student sexual
harassment and abuse. Title IX’s protections thus remain simply unavailable to
most students who are sexually harassed or abused.
To remedy this legal impotence, Title IX doctrine and policy should
account for the impact of cognitive heuristics and the immaturities of children’s
and adolescents’ neurodevelopment on their decision-making. More specifically,
courts should reconceptualize the actual notice standard to incorporate
understandings from empirical research on children’s mental processing.
Further, courts should incorporate a burden-shifting framework in its evaluation
385. See id.
386. Malia Herman, Threat of Data-Privacy Litigation Fuels District Insurance Purchases,
EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/10/21/threat-of-data-privacylitigation-fuels-district-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/EY8H-MEE8]; see also Dave Arnold, Insuring
Your Good Name, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/14629.htm [https://perma.cc/P7D29PKP]; Errors & Omissions/General Liability Fund, N.C. SCH. BOARDS ASS’N,
http://www.ncsba.org/risk-management/errors-omissionsgeneral-liability-fund/
[https://perma.cc/VW34-72VT]; Risk Management Fund, GA. SCH. BOARDS ASS’N,
https://gsba.com/member-services/risk-management/about-rms/risk-management-fund/#school
[https://perma.cc/GCM8-XUCE]. With such insurance, schools’ operating resources are not used to pay
civil claims, at least not directly, because such claims are paid by insurance policies. See Arnold, supra;
Errors & Omissions/General Liability Fund, supra; Risk Management Fund, supra. Those polices thus
protect the student population at large from experiencing any disadvantages as a result of the school
having to pay an award in damages to any individual student. See Arnold, supra; Errors &
Omissions/General Liability Fund, supra; Risk Management Fund, supra. While such insurance itself
could generate a classic moral hazard by reducing schools’ incentives to protect against sexual
harassment because they will not have to pay for it, insurance companies can and do guard against those
effects by not covering such claims. See Baker, supra note 381, at 280–81 (“[G]eneral controls over an
insured’s ability to recover loss reflect the widespread agreement that insurance has a significant effect
on what people do to recover from loss.”). Relatedly, in the context of police regulation, John Rappaport
cogently contends that through the use of original empirical research, private insurance can have a
significant role in part because the insurer “develops a financial incentive to reduce that risk through loss
prevention.” John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539,
1543–53 (2017). Although this is beyond the scope of this Article, much could be gained from similar
empirical research to determine the full extent of the role private insurance could play in the public
school context.
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of actual notice to remedy the present unilateral assessment of whether schools
have received sufficient information without regard for children’s capacity to
provide such information. Finally, Title IX should be amended to require schools
to facilitate and encourage student reporting of sexual harassment and abuse.
These changes would not only help eliminate the paradox that lies at the heart of
Title IX’s actual notice standard, but they would also reinvigorate Title IX’s
central purpose: to protect students who suffer sexual harassment and abuse in
school.

